kimai/kimai
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.53.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2.53.0
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-80200
Kimai has an Open Redirect via Unvalidated RelayState in SAML ACS Handler
Summary
The SAML authentication success handler in Kimai returns the RelayState POST parameter as a redirect destination without validating the host or scheme. After a user successfully authenticates via SAML, they are redirected to an attacker-controlled URL if the IdP includes a malicious RelayState value. This enables phishing attacks that steal credentials or session tokens post-SSO.
*Requires SAML to be enabled (non-default configuration).*
Details
Vulnerable file: src/Saml/Security/SamlAuthenticationSuccessHandler.php
// Line 27-33
$relayState = $request->request->get('RelayState', $request->query->get('RelayState'));
if (\is_scalar($relayState)) {
$relayState = (string) $relayState;
if ($relayState !== $this->httpUtils->generateUri($request, (string) $this->options['login_path'])) {
return $relayState; // No host/scheme validation — any URL accepted
}
}
The only check is that RelayState does not equal the configured login_path. Any external URL (e.g., https://attacker.com) passes this check and is returned as the redirect destination.
The existing unit test SamlAuthenticationSuccessHandlerTest::testRelayState() confirms this behavior — an absolute URL in RelayState results in a redirect to that URL with no restriction.
Steps to Reproduce
1. Enable SAML authentication in Kimai
2. Configure a SAML IdP (e.g., SimpleSAMLphp)
3. Initiate IdP-initiated SSO with RelayState=https://attacker.com
— or intercept the ACS POST and modify RelayState to https://attacker.com
4. Complete SAML authentication at the IdP
5. Observe: after the SAMLResponse POST to /saml/acs, Kimai issues:
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://attacker.com
Code-confirmed via unit test (testRelayState): onAuthenticationSuccess with RelayState=http://localhost/relayed redirects directly to that URL. External URLs follow the same code path.
Impact
While this bug exists it has low practical possibilities and the attacker needs to be able to create a SAML request, meaning either admin access to an IdP supporting such an action OR access to the private SAML keys / certificates.
In other words: only exploitable in IdP-initiated SSO flows where the IdP includes a RelayState value supplied by the attacker (e.g., via a malicious link to the IdP).
Fix
The RelayState is validated before redirecting, see #5878
//. Low Basis: The source's own band: LOW
0, fixed 2.53.0 (ecosystem)2.53.0
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0