lemmy_api_common
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.19.18(semver)
Fixed versions
0.19.18
Fix
- Fixed version
0.19.18cargo update -p lemmy_api_common --precise 0.19.18
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-42180
Lemmy has SSRF in /api/v3/post via Webmention dispatch
Summary
Lemmy allows an authenticated low-privileged user to create a link post through POST /api/v3/post. When a post is created in a public community, the backend asynchronously sends a Webmention to the attacker-controlled link target.
The submitted URL is checked for syntax and scheme, but the audited code path does not reject loopback, private, or link-local destinations before the Webmention request is issued. This lets a normal user trigger server-side HTTP requests toward internal services.
Details
The entry point is the normal post creation API. The user-controlled url field is accepted, normalized with diesel_url_create(), and only validated with is_valid_url(). That validation allows http and https but does not implement internal address rejection.
The post creation flow then schedules Webmention delivery for public communities. This creates a direct source-to-sink path from an externally supplied post URL to a server-side outbound HTTP request.
Core vulnerable code path:
// crates/api_crud/src/post/create.rs
let url = diesel_url_create(data.url.as_deref())?;
if let Some(url) = &url {
is_url_blocked(url, &url_blocklist)?;
is_valid_url(url)?;
}
// crates/utils/src/utils/validation.rs
pub fn is_valid_url(url: &Url) -> LemmyResult<()> {
let is_valid = ["http", "https", "magnet"].contains(&url.scheme());
if !is_valid {
Err(LemmyErrorType::InvalidUrl)?
}
Ok(())
}
// crates/api_crud/src/post/create.rs
if community.visibility == CommunityVisibility::Public {
let post = inserted_post.clone();
let url = url.clone();
spawn_try_task(async move {
if let Some(url) = url {
Webmention::new(post.ap_id.clone().into(), url.into()).send().await?;
}
Ok(())
});
}
These snippets matter because they show that the attacker controls CreatePost.url, the only validation is scheme-level, and the resulting URL is later used for server-side Webmention delivery.
PoC
_Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability._Prerequisites:
Practical reproduction flow:
127.0.0.1:8081.url set to the internal target.Complete PoC:
POST /api/v3/post HTTP/1.1
Host: victim.example
Authorization: Bearer <low-priv-jwt>
Content-Type: application/json
{
"name": "wm-ssrf",
"community_id": 1,
"url": "http://127.0.0.1:8081/",
"body": null,
"alt_text": null,
"honeypot": null,
"nsfw": false,
"language_id": null,
"custom_thumbnail": null
}
Outcome:
post_view response.http://127.0.0.1:8081/ as part of Webmention processing.Impact
An authenticated user can use the application server as a blind SSRF primitive against internal HTTP services. This can expose internal network reachability, trigger internal webhooks or administrative endpoints, and expand the attack surface beyond the public deployment boundary.
Because the sink is reached after ordinary user content submission, the issue is practical to exploit in real deployments where normal users can post to public communities.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 0.19.18 (semver)0.19.18
0.19.18cargo update -p lemmy_api_common --precise 0.19.18Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0