github.com/projectcalico/calicoctl/v3
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed3.31.6(semver)
Fixed versions
3.31.6
Fix
- Fixed version
3.31.6go get github.com/projectcalico/calicoctl/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-6720, GO-2026-5893
Calico Inserts Sensitive Information into Log File
When calicoctl is invoked with --log-level=info or --log-level=debug, the client prints the full contents of its loaded connection-configuration struct to stderr in a single log line. The struct embeds every credential calicoctl uses to talk to the cluster — inline kubeconfig (with bearer token), Kubernetes API bearer token, etcd password, and inline PEM-encoded etcd client certificate and key. Any reader of that stderr stream — CI job logs, session-recording archives, shared support-ticket transcripts, or local filesystem viewers on the host that ran calicoctl — can extract these credentials with zero Kubernetes privilege. calicoctl's default log level is panic, so this issue only triggers when verbose logging is explicitly enabled.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 3.31.6 (semver)3.31.6
3.31.6go get github.com/projectcalico/calicoctl/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0