Advisory

GHSA-3m4q-jmj6-r34q

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Expanded Validation (Multiple Attack Scenarios)

The following test harness generalises the attack for multiple HDF5 constructs:

  • Build a minimal feed-forward model and baseline weights.
  • Create three malicious variants:
  1. External storage dataset: dataset references /etc/hosts.
  2. External link: ExternalLink pointing at /etc/passwd.
  3. Indirect link: external storage referencing a helper HDF5 that, in turn, refers to /etc/hostname.
  • Run each scenario under strace -f -e trace=open,openat,read while calling model.load_weights(...).
  • Post-process traces and weight tensors to show the exact bytes loaded.

Relevant syscall excerpts captured during the run:

openat(AT_FDCWD, "/etc/hosts", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = 7
read(7, "127.0.0.1 localhost\n", 64) = 21
...
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = 9
read(9, "root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\n", 64) = 32
...
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/etc/hostname", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = 8
read(8, "example-host\n", 64) = 13

The corresponding model weight bytes (converted to ASCII) mirrored these file contents, confirming successful exfiltration in every case.

Recommended Product Fix

  1. Default-deny external datasets/links:
  • Inspect creation property lists (get_external_count) before materialising tensors.
  • Resolve SoftLink / ExternalLink targets and block if they leave the HDF5 file.
  1. Provide an escape hatch:
  • Offer an explicit allow_external_data=True flag or environment variable for advanced users who truly rely on HDF5 external storage.
  1. Documentation:
  • Update security guidance and API docs to clarify that weight loading bypasses safe mode and that external HDF5 references are rejected by default.
  1. Regression coverage:
  • Add automated tests mirroring the scenarios above to ensure future refactors do not reintroduce the issue.

Workarounds

  • Avoid loading untrusted HDF5 weight files.
  • Pre-scan weight files using h5py to detect external datasets or links before invoking Keras loaders.
  • Prefer alternate formats (e.g., NumPy .npz) that lack external reference capabilities when exchanging weights.
  • If isolation is unavoidable, run the load inside a sandboxed environment with limited filesystem access.

Timeline (UTC)

  • 2025‑10‑18: Initial proof against TensorFlow 2.12.0 confirmed local file disclosure.
  • 2025‑10‑19: Re-validated on TensorFlow 2.20.0 / Keras 3.11.3 with syscall tracing; produced weight artifacts and JSON summaries for each malicious scenario; implemented safe_keras_hdf5.py prototype guard.

Sources & licences