Advisory

GHSA-3m6q-jj5j-38c9

Also known as: CVE-2026-54592

Summary

Oj: Stack Buffer Overflow in Oj::Doc#each_child via Deeply Nested Input

Details

Summary

Oj::Doc#each_child, when invoked recursively over a deeply nested JSON
document, overflows a fixed-size stack buffer and aborts the process. This is a
denial of service reachable from untrusted JSON.

Details

Two-step chain in ext/oj/fast.c:

  1. `doc_each_child` (~line 1501) increments doc->where past the where_path[MAX_STACK = 100] array with no bounds check, and never restores it (doc->where-- is missing). Calling each_child recursively from inside the yield block therefore drives doc->where beyond the array.
  1. On the next entry (~line 1478) the function copies the path into a stack-local buffer:
   Leaf  save_path[MAX_STACK];           // 800-byte stack buffer
   size_t wlen = doc->where - doc->where_path;
   if (0 < wlen) {
       memcpy(save_path, doc->where_path, sizeof(Leaf) * (wlen + 1));
   }

When the previous recursive call left doc->where past where_path[100],
wlen exceeds MAX_STACK and the memcpy overflows save_path on the C
stack.

The Oj::Doc parser imposes no JSON nesting-depth limit (it relies on a
C-stack pressure check), so deeply nested attacker input reaches this path.

Proof of Concept

require 'oj'
depth = 200
payload = '[' * depth + '1' + ']' * depth
Oj::Doc.open(payload) do |doc|
  r = lambda { doc.each_child { |_| r.call } }
  r.call
end

Recursion depth <= 99 iterates normally; depth >= 101 aborts. lldb backtrace
on the affected build (ruby 3.3.8 / arm64-darwin24):

SIGABRT
#2 __abort
#3 __stack_chk_fail
#4 doc_each_child   (oj.bundle, fast.c)

Impact

Reliable denial of service: any endpoint that calls
Oj::Doc.open(untrusted) { |d| d.each_child ... } recursively can be crashed
with a small deeply-nested payload. On builds with a stack protector (the
default, -fstack-protector-strong) the canary aborts the process before the
saved return address is used. The Step-1 heap OOB writes into struct _doc
fields do occur, but are masked in practice because the Step-2 stack overflow
crashes first; turning them into anything beyond a crash has not been
demonstrated.

Patches

Fixed in 3.17.3: doc_each_child now bounds-checks before incrementing
doc->where (raising Oj::DepthError) and restores doc->where after the
loop, matching the existing each_leaf pattern. Verified on the fixed build:
depth >= 101 raises a clean Oj::DepthError instead of aborting.

Credit

Reported by Zac Wang (@7a6163).

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-06-19 19:36 UTC
Modified
2026-09-10 03:50 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

oj

RubyGems · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 3.17.3 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

3.17.3

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

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View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences