github.com/distribution/distribution/v3
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed3.1.0(semver)
Fixed versions
3.1.0
Fix
- Fixed version
3.1.0go get github.com/distribution/distribution/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-33540, GO-2026-5094
Distribution affected by pull-through cache credential exfiltration via www-authenticate bearer realm
hi guys,
commit: 40594bd98e6d6ed993b5c6021c93fdf96d2e5851 (as-of 2026-01-31)
contact: GitHub Security Advisory (https://github.com/distribution/distribution/security/advisories/new)
summary
in pull-through cache mode, distribution discovers token auth endpoints by parsing WWW-Authenticate challenges returned by the configured upstream registry. the realm URL from a bearer challenge is used without validating that it matches the upstream registry host. as a result, an attacker-controlled upstream (or an attacker with MitM position to the upstream) can cause distribution to send the configured upstream credentials via basic auth to an attacker-controlled realm URL.
this is the same vulnerability class as CVE-2020-15157 (containerd), but in distribution’s pull-through cache proxy auth flow.
severity
HIGH
note: the baseline impact is credential disclosure of the configured upstream credentials. if a deployment uses broader credentials for upstream auth (for example cloud iam credentials), the downstream impact can be higher; i am not claiming this as default for all deployments.
impact
credential exfiltration of the upstream authentication material configured for the pull-through cache.
attacker starting positions that make this realistic:
affected components
registry/proxy/proxyauth.go:66-81 (getAuthURLs): extracts bearer realm from upstream WWW-Authenticate without validating destinationinternal/client/auth/session.go:485-510 (fetchToken): uses the realm URL directly for token fetchinternal/client/auth/session.go:429-434 (fetchTokenWithBasicAuth): sends credentials via basic auth to the realm URLreproduction
attachment: poc.zip (local harness) with canonical and control runs.
the harness is local and does not contact a real registry: it uses two local HTTP servers (upstream + attacker token service) to demonstrate whether basic auth is sent to an attacker-chosen realm.
unzip -q -o poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
make canonical
make control
expected output (excerpt):
[CALLSITE_HIT]: getAuthURLs::configureAuth
[PROOF_MARKER]: basic_auth_sent=true realm_host=127.0.0.1 account_param=user authorization_prefix=Basic
control output (excerpt):
[CALLSITE_HIT]: getAuthURLs::configureAuth
[NC_MARKER]: realm_validation=PASS basic_auth_sent=false
suggested remediation
validate that the token realm destination is within the intended trust boundary before associating credentials with it or sending any authentication to it. one conservative option is strict same-host binding: only accept a realm whose host matches the configured upstream host.
fix accepted when
addendum.md
poc.zip
PR_DESCRIPTION.md
RUNNABLE_POC.md
best,
oleh
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 3.1.0 (semver)3.1.0
3.1.0go get github.com/distribution/distribution/[email protected]0, last affected 2.8.3 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0