Details
Relevant output from my run:
{
"axiosVersion": "1.18.1",
"configuredControls": {
"lookup": "reject every DNS lookup with EPOLICY",
"proxy": "http://127.0.0.1:<port> (reject every request)"
},
"http1Control": "EPOLICY: blocked by application DNS policy",
"http2Result": {
"status": 200,
"data": "REACHED_BLOCKED_ORIGIN"
},
"lookupCalls": 1,
"proxyObservedTraffic": false,
"events": [
{
"server": "origin",
"protocol": "h2",
"path": "/internal"
}
]
}
The important parts of the output are:
http1ControlcontainsEPOLICY, proving the DNS policy blocks the destination under HTTP/1.lookupCallsis still1after both requests, proving HTTP/2 never called the configured resolver.proxyObservedTrafficisfalse, proving HTTP/2 did not use the configured proxy.http2Result.statusis200, and the sole event belongs to the origin, proving Axios connected directly to the blocked destination.
Impact
The vulnerable configuration is a Node.js application that:
- enables Axios HTTP/2 using
httpVersion: 2; - lets an application user influence the request destination; and
- relies on Axios's
lookupoption or proxy routing to enforce a destination or egress policy.
In that setup, an unauthenticated application user may be able to make the server connect directly to loopback, private-network, or link-local services that the lookup policy or proxy would have rejected. Depending on the reachable service, this can expose cloud credentials or internal data, modify internal services, or affect availability.
HTTP/2 support is marked experimental, but neither the HTTP/2 documentation nor the proxy documentation says that lookup and proxy controls are ignored. The proxy documentation states that HTTPS requests are sent through a CONNECT tunnel. More importantly, Axios's threat model tells callers that destination validation is their responsibility; this behavior silently bypasses such caller-supplied validation.
I did not test against any third-party or production service. The PoC only uses listeners on my own machine.
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