github.com/traefik/traefik/v2
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.11.51(semver)
Fixed versions
2.11.51
Fix
- Fixed version
2.11.51go get github.com/traefik/traefik/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-54764, GO-2026-6202
Traefik: ForwardAuth middleware leaks X-Forwarded-Port spoofing via untrusted X-Forwarded-Proto when trustForwardHeader=false
Summary
There is a medium severity vulnerability in Traefik's ForwardAuth middleware. Even when configured with trustForwardHeader: false, Traefik derives the X-Forwarded-Port header sent to the authentication service from the original incoming request instead of the sanitized forwarded request. As a result, an unauthenticated remote attacker can inject an X-Forwarded-Proto: https header over a plain HTTP connection and cause Traefik to forward X-Forwarded-Port: 443 to the auth service, bypassing port-based authorization checks. This is a regression of the incomplete fix for GHSA-6384-m2mw-rf54, which addressed the X-Forwarded-Proto and X-Forwarded-Prefix spoofing vectors but missed the X-Forwarded-Port vector.
Patches
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
<details>
<summary>Original Description</summary>
Summary
The ForwardAuth middleware, even when configured with trustForwardHeader: false,
still derives the X-Forwarded-Port header sent to the authentication service by
reading the attacker-controlled X-Forwarded-Proto header from the original
incoming request. This allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause Traefik
to forward X-Forwarded-Port: 443 to the auth service on a plain HTTP connection,
creating an inconsistency that can bypass port-based authorization checks.
### Details
The fix introduced in commit 5e1de2258 (released as part of the April 2026 security
advisory GHSA-6384-m2mw-rf54) correctly strips all X-Forwarded-* headers from the
forwarded auth request when trustForwardHeader=false, and reconstructs
X-Forwarded-Proto from the actual TLS state of the connection (req.TLS).
However, the reconstruction of X-Forwarded-Port is delegated to the helper
forwardedPort(req) which receives the original request (req) rather than
the sanitized forward request (forwardReq):
// pkg/middlewares/auth/forward.go – writeHeader()
if !trustForwardHeader {
forwardedheaders.DeleteXForwardedHeaders(forwardReq.Header) // strips all X-Fwd-* from forwardReq
}
// ...
if _, ok := forwardReq.Header[forwardedheaders.XForwardedPort]; !ok {
forwardReq.Header.Set(forwardedheaders.XForwardedPort, forwardedPort(req)) // ← req = ORIGINAL
}
// pkg/middlewares/auth/forward.go – forwardedPort()
func forwardedPort(req *http.Request) string {
if _, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(req.Host); err == nil && port != "" {
return port
}
// Reads attacker-controlled header on the ORIGINAL request:
if req.Header.Get(forwardedheaders.XForwardedProto) == "https" || ... {
return "443"
}
if req.TLS != nil {
return "443"
}
return "80"
}
Result when trustForwardHeader=false and attacker sends X-Forwarded-Proto: https
on a plain HTTP connection:
┌──────────────────────────────────┬──────────┬────────┐
│ Header forwarded to auth service │ Expected │ Actual │
├──────────────────────────────────┼──────────┼────────┤
│ X-Forwarded-Proto │ http │ http ✓ │
├──────────────────────────────────┼──────────┼────────┤
│ X-Forwarded-Port │ 80 │ 443 ✗ │
└──────────────────────────────────┴──────────┴────────┘
The inconsistency between Proto=http and Port=443 is exploitable against any
authentication service that gates access based on X-Forwarded-Port.
### PoC
Traefik configuration:
middlewares:
my-auth:
forwardAuth:
address: "http://auth-service/"
trustForwardHeader: false # security setting, but still bypassable
routers:
api:
rule: "PathPrefix(`/api`)"
middlewares:
- my-auth
service: backend
Auth service logic (example victim):
# auth-service checks: only port 443 requests are considered "secure"
port = request.headers.get("X-Forwarded-Port", "80")
proto = request.headers.get("X-Forwarded-Proto", "http")
if port == "443":
return 200 # grant access
return 403
Attack:
Plain HTTP connection, no TLS – but spoofs port 443
curl -H "X-Forwarded-Proto: https" http://traefik.example.com/api/admin
Auth service receives X-Forwarded-Port: 443 → grants access
Verification: Enable Traefik debug logging and observe X-Forwarded-Port: 443
in the auth request while the connection is plain HTTP.
### Impact
Any deployment using the ForwardAuth middleware with trustForwardHeader: false where
the downstream authentication service uses X-Forwarded-Port to make authorization
decisions is vulnerable to privilege escalation. An unauthenticated attacker can
bypass port-based security checks (e.g., "only allow requests arriving on HTTPS port
443") by injecting a single X-Forwarded-Proto: https header on a plain HTTP
connection.
This is a regression of the incomplete fix for GHSA-6384-m2mw-rf54: while the
X-Forwarded-Prefix and X-Forwarded-Proto spoofing vectors were addressed, the
X-Forwarded-Port vector was missed.
</details>
---
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 2.11.51 (semver)2.11.51
2.11.51go get github.com/traefik/traefik/[email protected]0, fixed 3.6.22 (semver)3.6.22
3.6.22go get github.com/traefik/traefik/[email protected]3.7.0, fixed 3.7.6 (semver)3.7.6
3.7.6go get github.com/traefik/traefik/[email protected]0, last affected 1.7.34 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0