Details
- an application that constructs a submodule from untrusted input via
Repo.create_submodule(name=...)(single call); or Repo.clone_fromof an untrusted repository followed bysubmodule_update— the canonical submodule threat model, where the malicious name is read from the cloned.gitmodules.
No non-default git settings are required. Primarily a Unix vector: on Windows the " in the resulting .git/modules/<name> directory name can abort the fresh-clone write branch (the direct config-API and create_submodule sinks are unaffected).
Recommended fix
Reject or escape configuration section/subsection/option names that contain ], [, ", or leading/trailing whitespace (or apply git's own section-name escaping) in _assure_config_name_safe / write_section, rather than only CR/LF/NUL. Validating submodule names before they reach sm_section would additionally close the clone-driven path.