zebrad
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed4.3.0(semver)
Fixed versions
4.3.0
Fix
- Fixed version
4.3.0cargo update -p zebrad --precise 4.3.0
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-34377
Zebra has a Consensus Failure due to Improper Verification of V5 Transactions
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CVE-2026-34377: Consensus Failure via Crafted V5 Authorization Data
Summary
A logic error in Zebra's transaction verification cache could allow a malicious miner to induce a consensus split. By matching a valid transaction's txid while providing invalid authorization data, a miner could cause vulnerable Zebra nodes to accept an invalid block, leading to a consensus split from the rest of the Zcash network. To be clear, this would not allow invalid transactions to be accepted but could result in a consensus split between vulnerable Zebra nodes and invulnerable Zebra and Zcashd nodes.
Severity
High - This is a Consensus Vulnerability that could allow a malicious miner to induce network partitioning, service disruption, and potential double-spend attacks against affected nodes.
Affected Versions
All Zebra versions supporting V5 transactions (Network Upgrade 5 and later) prior to version 4.3.0.
Description
The vulnerability exists in the find_verified_unmined_tx function within transaction.rs. This function was designed to optimize block verification by checking if a transaction was already verified in the mempool.
The lookup mechanism used the ZIP-244 `txid` as the unique key. However, for V5 transactions, the txid specifically excludes the Authorization Data Root (signatures and proofs). Because Zebra returned a "verified" status based solely on the txid, it skipped the essential check_v5_auth() call for the transaction version provided in the block.
An attacker (specifically a malicious miner) could exploit this by:
txid but contains invalid signatures or proofs.txid in its mempool and incorrectly assumes the block's version of the transaction is already verified.zcashd or zebra nodes without that transaction in their mempool) reject the block, resulting in a chain fork where the poisoned Zebra node is isolated.Impact
Consensus Failure
Fixed Versions
This issue is fixed in Zebra 4.3.0.
The fix ensures that verification is only skipped if the transaction's full integrity—including authorization data—is validated against the mempool entry.
Mitigation
Users should upgrade to Zebra 4.3.0 or later immediately.
There are no known workarounds for this issue. Immediate upgrade is the only way to ensure the node remains on the correct consensus path and is protected against malicious chain forks.
Resources
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High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 4.3.0 (semver)4.3.0
4.3.0cargo update -p zebrad --precise 4.3.00, fixed 5.0.1 (semver)5.0.1
5.0.1cargo update -p zebra-consensus --precise 5.0.1Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0