Advisory

GHSA-3xxc-pwj6-jgrj

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

print("\n\033[92m[+] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: Authorization Bypass successful! The Verifier accepted the authentic signature under the forged 'Spoofed TSA' name due to Trust Boundary Confusion.\033[0m\n")
except Exception as e:
print("\n\033[91m[-] Verification failed:\033[0m", e)

if __name__ == '__main__':
main()


1. Requests a timestamp from `https://freetsa.org/tsr`.
2. Generates a fake cert with `common_name="Spoofed TSA"` and `ExtendedKeyUsage=TIME_STAMPING`.
3. Parses the authentic TS response, injects a dummy cert issued by FreeTSA's leaf.
4. Injects the fake cert into the bag.
5. Invokes `decode_timestamp_response()` on the malicious bytes.
6. Runs `VerifierBuilder(common_name="Spoofed TSA", ...).verify_message(malicious_resp, msg)`.
7. Observes a successful verification bypassing the `common_name` constraint.

### Impact

**Vulnerability Type:** Authorization Bypass / Improper Certificate Validation / Trust Boundary Confusion
**Impact:** High. Applications relying on `rfc3161-client` to guarantee the origin of a timestamp via `tsa_certificate` or `common_name` pinning are completely exposed to impersonation. An attacker can forge the identity of the TSA as long as they hold *any* valid timestamp from a CA trusted by the Verifier.

Sources & licences