github.com/free5gc/smf
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected1.4.3(semver)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-44321, GO-2026-5109
free5GC's SMF UPI POST /upi/v1/upNodesLinks exits the SMF process on overlapping UE pools (unauthenticated, reachable Fatalf)
Summary
free5GC's SMF mounts the UPI management route group without inbound OAuth2 middleware (same root cause as free5gc/free5gc#887). The POST /upi/v1/upNodesLinks create-or-update handler accepts attacker-controlled JSON and passes it directly into UpNodesFromConfiguration(), which calls logger.InitLog.Fatalf(...) on several validation failures. One confirmed path is the UE-IP-pool overlap check: a single unauthenticated POST that adds a new UPF whose pool overlaps an existing UPF terminates the entire SMF process (docker ps shows Exited (1)), not just the goroutine. This is a stronger sink than free5gc/free5gc#905: that one panics inside the request goroutine and Gin recovers; this one calls Fatalf which is os.Exit(1)-equivalent and kills the whole SMF process, dropping all of SMF's SBI surface (PDU-session establishment, UE policy lookups, etc.) until the process is restarted.
Details
Validated against the SMF container in the official Docker compose lab.
v4.2.1free5gc/smf:v4.2.18385c00a2026-03-21T23:47:07Z)http://10.100.200.6:8000The broader UPI auth gap (#887) lets the unauthenticated POST reach the create/update handler. From there:
Vulnerable handler dispatches into topology parsing:
POST /upi/v1/upNodesLinks
-> UpNodesFromConfiguration()
-> isOverlap(allUEIPPools)
-> logger.InitLog.Fatalf("overlap cidr value between UPFs")
Code evidence (paths in free5gc/smf):
NFs/smf/internal/sbi/server.go:76NFs/smf/internal/sbi/server.go:78UpNodesFromConfiguration():NFs/smf/internal/sbi/api_upi.go:60NFs/smf/internal/sbi/api_upi.go:72NFs/smf/internal/context/user_plane_information.go:413Fatalf:NFs/smf/internal/context/user_plane_information.go:479The same unauthenticated POST path also reaches sibling Fatalf calls for invalid-pool and static-pool-exclusion failures, so this is not a one-off code smell -- it is a class of attacker-reachable Fatalf call sites on a single unauthenticated handler:
NFs/smf/internal/context/user_plane_information.go:416NFs/smf/internal/context/user_plane_information.go:424NFs/smf/internal/context/user_plane_information.go:430PoC
Reproduced end-to-end against the running SMF at http://10.100.200.6:8000.
10.60.0.0/16):curl -i -X POST http://10.100.200.6:8000/upi/v1/upNodesLinks \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data '{"links":[{"A":"gNB1","B":"UPF-OVERLAP-20260322"}],"upNodes":{"UPF-OVERLAP-20260322":{"type":"UPF","nodeID":"198.51.100.20","addr":"198.51.100.20","sNssaiUpfInfos":[{"sNssai":{"sst":1,"sd":"010203"},"dnnUpfInfoList":[{"dnn":"internet","pools":[{"cidr":"10.60.0.0/16"}]}]}]}}}'
Client-side observation (server died mid-request, no HTTP response written):
curl: (52) Empty reply from server
docker ps -a --filter name=smf --format '{{.Names}}\t{{.Status}}'
smf Exited (1) 9 seconds ago
docker logs --tail 80 smf) show the FATA line that terminated the process:[FATA][SMF][Init] overlap cidr value between UPFs
Impact
Unauthenticated process-kill DoS on the SMF management plane.
UPI route group makes the trigger reachable to any off-path network attacker who can reach SMF on the SBI -- no token, no UE state needed. The same-instance nsmf-oam returning 401 (see free5gc/free5gc#887) proves OAuth middleware is wired in for other SMF route groups and only missing on UPI.logger.InitLog.Fatalf(...) on attacker-influenced validation failures. Fatalf is os.Exit(1)-equivalent -- it skips Gin's recovery, the deferred handlers, and kills the whole SMF process. This is materially worse than the related panic-DoS in free5gc/free5gc#905, which Gin recovers from at the goroutine level.Any party that can reach SMF on the SBI can:
Fatalf paths (invalid-pool, static-pool exclusion) to sustain the same DoS even if the overlap check is hardened in isolation, because the underlying defect is using Fatalf for request-time validation on an unauthenticated handler.No Confidentiality impact (the crash returns no data to the attacker). No persistent Integrity impact (the topology updates are in-memory and are lost when SMF dies). The whole impact concentrates in Availability: complete loss of SMF service via a single unauthenticated request.
Affected: free5gc v4.2.1.
Upstream issue: https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/906
Upstream fix: https://github.com/free5gc/smf/pull/203
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, last affected 1.4.3 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0