Advisory

GHSA-46q5-g3j9-wx5c

Also known as: CVE-2026-32231

Summary

ZeptoClaw: Generic webhook channel trusts caller-supplied identity fields; allowlist is checked against untrusted payload data

Details

Summary
The generic webhook channel trusts caller-supplied identity fields (sender, chat_id) from the request body and applies authorization checks to those untrusted values. Because authentication is optional and defaults to disabled (auth_token: None), an attacker who can reach POST /webhook can spoof an allowlisted sender and choose arbitrary chat_id values, enabling high-risk message spoofing and potential IDOR-style session/chat routing abuse.

Details
Relevant code paths:

  • src/channels/webhook.rs:121 sets runtime default auth_token: None.
  • src/config/types.rs:910 also defaults webhook config auth_token to None.
  • src/channels/webhook.rs:224 (validate_auth) explicitly allows requests when no token is configured.
  • src/channels/webhook.rs:128 defines WebhookPayload with identity fields fully controlled by caller input:
  • sender: String
  • chat_id: String
  • src/channels/webhook.rs:421 performs allowlist authorization using payload.sender.
  • src/channels/webhook.rs:433 and src/channels/webhook.rs:434 create InboundMessage using untrusted payload.sender and payload.chat_id.

Why this is vulnerable:

  • The system treats user-provided JSON identity as authoritative identity.
  • Allowlist enforcement does not verify sender authenticity beyond that payload value.
  • chat_id is also attacker-controlled, so routing/session association can be steered to arbitrary chats/conversations.
  • If the webhook is exposed without strong upstream authn/authz controls, spoofing is straightforward.

PoC

  1. Configure the webhook channel in a vulnerable posture (common default behavior):
  • enabled = true
  • bind_address = "0.0.0.0" (or any reachable interface)
  • port = 9876
  • path = "/webhook"
  • auth_token = null (or omitted)
  • allow_from = ["trusted-user-1"]
  • deny_by_default = true
  1. Start ZeptoClaw.
  2. Send a forged request with attacker-chosen sender and chat_id, without any Authorization header:
curl -i -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:9876/webhook" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  --data '{
    "message":"FORGED: run privileged workflow",
    "sender":"trusted-user-1",
    "chat_id":"victim-chat-42"
  }'
  1. Observe:
  • Response is HTTP/1.1 200 OK.
  • Message is accepted as if it originated from trusted-user-1.
  • Message is routed under attacker-chosen chat_id (victim-chat-42).

Impact

  • Vulnerability type:
  • Authentication/authorization bypass (identity spoofing)
  • IDOR-style routing/control issue via attacker-chosen chat_id
  • Affected deployments:
  • Any deployment exposing the generic webhook endpoint without strict upstream authentication and identity binding.
  • Security consequences:
  • Forged inbound messages from spoofed trusted users.
  • Bypass of allowlist intent by injecting allowlisted sender IDs in payload.
  • Cross-chat/session contamination or hijacking by choosing arbitrary chat_id.
  • Potential unauthorized downstream agent/tool actions triggered by malicious input.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-03-12 16:36 UTC
Modified
2026-03-13 13:57 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

zeptoclaw

crates.io · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.7.6 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.7.6

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.7.6
    cargo update -p zeptoclaw --precise 0.7.6

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences