Advisory

GHSA-4753-cmc8-8j9v

Also known as: CVE-2026-33528, GO-2026-4817

Summary

GoDoxy has a Path Traversal Vulnerability in its File API

Details

Summary

The file content API endpoint at /api/v1/file/content is vulnerable to path traversal. The filename query parameter is passed directly to path.Join(common.ConfigBasePath, filename) where ConfigBasePath = "config" (a relative path). No sanitization or validation is applied beyond checking that the field is non-empty (binding:"required").

An authenticated attacker can use ../ sequences to read or write files outside the intended config/ directory, including TLS private keys, OAuth refresh tokens, and any file accessible to the container's UID.

Root Cause

File: internal/api/v1/file/get.go, lines 68-73:

func (t FileType) GetPath(filename string) string {
    if t == FileTypeMiddleware {
        return path.Join(common.MiddlewareComposeBasePath, filename)
    }
    return path.Join(common.ConfigBasePath, filename)
}
  • common.ConfigBasePath = "config" — relative path, not absolute
  • path.Join("config", "../certs/key.pem") normalizes to "certs/key.pem" — escaping config/
  • No call to strings.HasPrefix, filepath.Rel, or any containment check exists
  • The format:"filename" struct tag is an OpenAPI/Swagger annotation only, not enforced by the validator

Proof of Concept

Environment

  • GoDoxy v0.27.4 (ghcr.io/yusing/godoxy:latest)
  • Authentication enabled with default credentials (admin/password)

Steps to Reproduce

Step 1 — Authenticate:

Step 2 — Read file outside config/ via path traversal:

GET /api/v1/file/content?type=config&filename=../certs/secret-agent-key.pem HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8888
Cookie: godoxy_token=<JWT>

HTTP Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate
Content-Length: 43
Content-Type: application/godoxy+yaml
Expires: 0
Pragma: no-cache

THIS_IS_A_SECRET_PRIVATE_KEY_FOR_AGENT_TLS

<img width="1489" height="286" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/05f3464f-20ba-4913-830d-9fcc2fa1a2e3" />

Impact

Files accessible via this vulnerability

| Path (relative to config/) | Contents | Risk |
|-------------------------------|----------|------|
| ../certs/agents/{host}.zip | CA cert + server cert + TLS private key | Impersonate GoDoxy server to remote agents |
| ../data/oauth_refresh_tokens.json | OIDC refresh tokens for all active sessions | Account takeover via token reuse |
| ../../etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt | System CA certificates | Information disclosure |
| Any file readable by UID 1000 | Depends on mounted volumes | Variable |

The PUT /api/v1/file/content endpoint is also affected. While the content must pass YAML schema validation (config or provider format), an attacker can write valid provider YAML files outside config/, potentially injecting malicious route definitions.

Suggested Remediation

Validate that the resolved path remains within the base directory:

func (t FileType) GetPath(filename string) (string, error) {
    var base string
    if t == FileTypeMiddleware {
        base = common.MiddlewareComposeBasePath
    } else {
        base = common.ConfigBasePath
    }

    absBase, _ := filepath.Abs(base)
    resolved, _ := filepath.Abs(filepath.Join(base, filename))

    if !strings.HasPrefix(resolved, absBase+string(filepath.Separator)) {
        return "", fmt.Errorf("path traversal detected: %s", filename)
    }

    return resolved, nil
}

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-03-24 16:35 UTC
Modified
2026-03-27 21:33 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/yusing/godoxy

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.27.5 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.27.5

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences