Advisory

GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99

Also known as: CVE-2026-62331, GO-2026-6908

Summary

praktor: Path traversal in Telegram file uploads allows writing outside the agent workspace uploads/ directory (stored instruction injection)

Details

Impact

A remote Telegram user can write files to arbitrary paths inside an agent's persistent workspace volume (praktor-wk-<workspace>, mounted at /workspace/agent), escaping the documented uploads/ directory.

The attacker controls the Telegram document filename, which was concatenated into the destination path without sanitization (internal/telegram/bot.go, at both upload sites) and resolved with path.Join, which collapses ../ sequences. A filename like ../../../CLAUDE.md resolved to the root of the agent workspace volume, outside uploads/.

Because the agent workspace is the persistent working directory the Claude agent reads from and operates on across runs, writing outside uploads/ lets an attacker plant or overwrite files the agent later consumes — e.g. CLAUDE.md, agent instruction/skill/hook files, or other config under /workspace/agent. This turns a file upload into a stored injection into the agent's instruction/execution surface (CWE-22 path traversal escalating to stored instruction injection).

Reachability

By default the bot has no user allowlist (allow_from: [] means "allow all"), so the only precondition is that a user can message the bot. No authentication or prior privilege is required.

Affected versions

Through v0.9.0 (and HEAD 3902d29).

Patched versions

v0.9.1, containing PR #228.

Workarounds

Restrict telegram.allow_from to trusted user IDs to limit who can send uploads to the bot. Upgrading to v0.9.1 is the recommended fix.

Fix (defense in depth)

  • internal/telegram/bot.go: apply path.Base() to the attacker-controlled filename at both upload sites, stripping directory components and ...
  • internal/container/manager.go: WriteVolumeBytes now rejects any path that escapes /vol after path.Join, protecting future callers.

Credit

Reported privately by tonghuaroot, who provided a detailed root-cause analysis, a deployed end-to-end proof of concept against the real container.Manager, and fix verification.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-11-03 17:27 UTC
Modified
2026-11-05 23:25 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.9.1 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.9.1

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences