glances
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed4.5.2(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
4.5.2
Fix
- Fixed version
4.5.2pip install --upgrade glances==4.5.2
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-32611, PYSEC-2026-2170
Glances has a SQL Injection in DuckDB Export via Unparameterized DDL Statements
Summary
The GHSA-x46r fix (commit 39161f0) addressed SQL injection in the TimescaleDB export module by converting all SQL operations to use parameterized queries and psycopg.sql composable objects. However, the DuckDB export module (glances/exports/glances_duckdb/__init__.py) was not included in this fix and contains the same class of vulnerability: table names and column names derived from monitoring statistics are directly interpolated into SQL statements via f-strings. While DuckDB INSERT values already use parameterized queries (? placeholders), the DDL construction and table name references do not escape or parameterize identifier names.
Details
The DuckDB export module constructs SQL DDL statements by directly interpolating stat field names and plugin names into f-strings.
Vulnerable CREATE TABLE construction (glances/exports/glances_duckdb/__init__.py:156-162):
create_query = f"""
CREATE TABLE {plugin} (
{', '.join(creation_list)}
);"""
self.client.execute(create_query)
The creation_list is built from stat dictionary keys in the update() method (glances/exports/glances_duckdb/__init__.py:117-118):
for key, value in plugin_stats.items():
creation_list.append(f"{key} {convert_types[type(self.normalize(value)).__name__]}")
The INSERT statement also uses the unescaped plugin name (glances/exports/glances_duckdb/__init__.py:172-174):
insert_query = f"""
INSERT INTO {plugin} VALUES (
{', '.join(['?' for _ in values])}
);"""
While INSERT values use ? placeholders (safe), the table name {plugin} is directly interpolated in both CREATE TABLE and INSERT INTO statements. Column names in creation_list are also directly interpolated without quoting.
Comparison with the TimescaleDB fix (commit 39161f0):
The TimescaleDB fix addressed this exact pattern by:
psycopg.sql.Identifier() for table and column namespsycopg.sql.SQL() for composing queries%s placeholders for all valuesThe DuckDB module was not part of this fix despite having the same vulnerability class.
Attack vector:
The primary attack vector is through stat dictionary keys. While most keys come from hardcoded psutil field names (e.g., cpu_percent, memory_usage), any future plugin that introduces dynamic keys from external data (container labels, custom metrics, user-defined sensor names) would create an exploitable injection path. Additionally, the table name (plugin) comes from the internal plugins list, but any custom plugin with a crafted name could inject SQL.
PoC
The injection is demonstrable when column or table names contain SQL metacharacters:
# Simulated injection via a hypothetical plugin with dynamic keys
# If a stat dict contained a key like:
# "cpu_percent BIGINT); DROP TABLE cpu; --"
# The creation_list would produce:
# "cpu_percent BIGINT); DROP TABLE cpu; -- VARCHAR"
# Which in the CREATE TABLE f-string becomes:
# CREATE TABLE plugin_name (
# time TIMETZ,
# hostname_id VARCHAR,
# cpu_percent BIGINT); DROP TABLE cpu; -- VARCHAR
# );
# Verify with DuckDB export enabled:
# 1. Configure DuckDB export in glances.conf:
# [duckdb]
# database=/tmp/glances.duckdb
# 2. Start Glances with DuckDB export and debug logging
glances --export duckdb --debug 2>&1 | grep "Create table"
# 3. Observe the unescaped SQL in debug output
Impact
Recommended Fix
Apply the same parameterization approach used in the TimescaleDB fix. DuckDB supports identifier quoting with double quotes:
# glances/exports/glances_duckdb/__init__.py
def _quote_identifier(name):
"""Quote a SQL identifier to prevent injection."""
# DuckDB uses double-quote escaping for identifiers
return '"' + name.replace('"', '""') + '"'
def export(self, plugin, creation_list, values_list):
"""Export the stats to the DuckDB server."""
logger.debug(f"Export {plugin} stats to DuckDB")
table_list = [t[0] for t in self.client.sql("SHOW TABLES").fetchall()]
if plugin not in table_list:
# Quote table and column names to prevent injection
quoted_plugin = _quote_identifier(plugin)
quoted_fields = []
for item in creation_list:
parts = item.split(' ', 1)
col_name = _quote_identifier(parts[0])
col_type = parts[1] if len(parts) > 1 else 'VARCHAR'
quoted_fields.append(f"{col_name} {col_type}")
create_query = f"CREATE TABLE {quoted_plugin} ({', '.join(quoted_fields)});"
try:
self.client.execute(create_query)
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Cannot create table {plugin}: {e}")
return
self.client.commit()
# Insert with quoted table name
quoted_plugin = _quote_identifier(plugin)
for values in values_list:
insert_query = f"INSERT INTO {quoted_plugin} VALUES ({', '.join(['?' for _ in values])});"
try:
self.client.execute(insert_query, values)
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Cannot insert data into table {plugin}: {e}")
self.client.commit()High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 4.5.2 (ecosystem)4.5.2
4.5.2pip install --upgrade glances==4.5.2Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0