Advisory

GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f

Also known as: None

Summary

ZeptoClaw: Email Sender Spoofing to bypass Header-Only From Allowlist Validation

Details

Summary
The email channel authorizes senders based on the parsed From header identity only. If upstream email authentication/enforcement is weak (for example, relaxed SPF/DKIM/DMARC handling), an attacker can spoof an allowlisted sender address and have the message treated as trusted input.

Details
Relevant code paths:

  • src/channels/email_channel.rs:311 extracts sender identity from parsed message headers:
  • let from = parsed.from() ... a.address() ...
  • src/channels/email_channel.rs:328 authorizes using that from value:
  • if !self.is_sender_allowed(&from) { ... }
  • src/channels/email_channel.rs:87 onward (is_sender_allowed) performs allowlist/domain matching against the same header-derived value.
  • There is no in-channel validation of sender authenticity indicators such as SPF/DKIM/DMARC results before allowlist trust decisions.

Result:

  • Trust decision is based on a potentially spoofable header field unless mailbox/provider-side anti-spoofing controls are strong and enforced.

PoC

  1. Configure email channel with strict sender allowlist:
  • channels.email.enabled = true
  • channels.email.allowed_senders = ["[email protected]"]
  • channels.email.deny_by_default = true
  1. Ensure the monitored mailbox accepts or forwards a spoofed message (for testing, use a local SMTP path that does not enforce sender authentication strongly).
  2. Send an email to the monitored inbox with forged header identity:
python - <<'PY'
import smtplib
from email.message import EmailMessage

msg = EmailMessage()
msg["From"] = "[email protected]"   # forged trusted sender
msg["To"] = "[email protected]"
msg["Subject"] = "forged control message"
msg.set_content("FORGED EMAIL CONTENT")

# Example test SMTP endpoint
with smtplib.SMTP("127.0.0.1", 25) as s:
    s.send_message(msg)
PY
  1. Wait for IMAP fetch/IDLE processing.
  2. Observe the message is accepted as allowlisted sender [email protected] and published as inbound channel input.

Impact

  • Vulnerability type: sender identity spoofing risk due to header-based authorization.
  • Affected deployments: those using email channel allowlists where upstream anti-spoof controls are weak, misconfigured, or bypassed.
  • Security effect:
  • Spoofed From headers may bypass logical sender allowlist.
  • Malicious content can enter trusted automation/agent flows as if sent by authorized identities.
  • Risk is reduced in environments with strict SPF/DKIM/DMARC enforcement and strong inbound mail hygiene, but not eliminated at application layer.

Patch Recommendation
Add a sender-authentication gate in src/channels/email_channel.rs immediately after parsing from (src/channels/email_channel.rs:311) and before allowlist enforcement (src/channels/email_channel.rs:328). The gate should require trusted SPF/DKIM/DMARC evidence with domain alignment (for example, DMARC=pass, or aligned SPF/DKIM pass) before is_sender_allowed is evaluated. For backward compatibility, add a configurable mode in EmailConfig (for example, sender_verification_mode), but recommend hardened settings in production: dmarc_aligned, exact-address allowlists, and deny_by_default=true.

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-03-12 16:38 UTC
Modified
2026-03-14 04:46 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

zeptoclaw

crates.io · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.7.6 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.7.6

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.7.6
    cargo update -p zeptoclaw --precise 0.7.6

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences