Advisory

GHSA-4g6j-g789-rghm

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Expected vulnerable output:

=== RUN   TestForgedAgentServiceResultCreatesHistoryForUnassignedService
--- PASS: TestForgedAgentServiceResultCreatesHistoryForUnassignedService
PASS
ok  	github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/singleton

Observed output in my local test environment:

=== RUN   TestForgedAgentServiceResultCreatesHistoryForUnassignedService
--- PASS: TestForgedAgentServiceResultCreatesHistoryForUnassignedService (0.01s)
PASS
ok  	github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/singleton	0.020s

The test passes because a forged result from reporter server 2 creates a service-history row for victim service 10, even though service 10 only covers victim server 1.

A fixed version should reject or ignore this forged result. After a fix, the current PoC should fail at the assertion waiting for a ServiceHistory row unless the test is changed to assert that count == 0.

Note: this is a local processing-path PoC. It directly exercises the same service sentinel worker that the authenticated gRPC RequestTask path dispatches to. It does not open a network gRPC connection, send real notifications, or execute commands.

Impact

A low-privilege Nezha user with a valid agent secret can forge service-monitor results for services outside their ownership boundary.

Confirmed impact:

  • Cross-tenant service-monitor integrity violation.
  • False service history entries for victim-owned services.
  • Poisoned service availability/current-state data.

Likely impact through the same processing path:

  • Victim-owned service notifications can be triggered with attacker-controlled result text.
  • Monitoring reliability can be degraded by false up/down/latency results.

This does not require dashboard administrator privileges. The attacker only needs a normal account/agent secret and one registered agent/server.

Sources & licences