Advisory

GHSA-4hf8-5mjm-rfgq

Also known as: CVE-2026-49357

Summary

Streamable HTTP mode exposes LINE Desktop read/send tools without MCP authentication

Details

Streamable HTTP mode exposes LINE Desktop read/send tools without MCP authentication

Summary

line-desktop-mcp supports a --http-mode Streamable HTTP transport for use with clients such as n8n. In this mode the server binds to 0.0.0.0 and exposes the MCP /mcp endpoint without an MCP-layer authentication check. Any network client that can reach the port can initialize a session, list tools, and call tools that read LINE Desktop chat history or send LINE messages through the already logged-in desktop application.

This is High for deployments where the HTTP port is reachable beyond the local host, because the server acts with the user authority of the logged-in LINE Desktop session. It is lower if the listener is strictly firewalled to trusted local clients.

Affected version

Repository: dtwang/line-desktop-mcp

Current source checked: fbed0d2d3048e63f48a356a1267ed8ec5e78f3ae on main, committed 2026-05-14.

Published npm package checked: [email protected].

Source evidence

README.md documents Streamable HTTP mode:

npx line-desktop-mcp@latest --http-mode --port 3000

The same README documents MCP endpoints at /mcp and explains that this mode is intended for clients such as n8n.

src/server.js registers LINE Desktop tools including:

  • get_line_chatroom_history_default
  • get_line_chatroom_history_long
  • get_line_chatroom_history_short
  • send_message_manual
  • send_message_auto

Those tool handlers call into the desktop automation layer: getChatHistory(...) and sendChatMessage(...).

In HTTP mode, src/server.js creates an Express app and Streamable HTTP transport, accepts POSTs to /mcp, creates sessions, connects the transport to the MCP server, and calls transport.handleRequest(...). I did not find an authentication or bearer-token check before session creation or tool invocation.

The listener is explicitly network-bound:

app.listen(port, 0.0.0.0, () => {
  console.error(`LINE Desktop MCP Server running on Streamable HTTP mode`);
  console.error(`  Local:   http://127.0.0.1:${port}${endpoint}`);
  console.error(`  Network: http://0.0.0.0:${port}${endpoint}`);
});

Vulnerability chain

  1. A user starts the server with --http-mode --port 3000.
  2. The server binds on 0.0.0.0:3000, not only loopback.
  3. A network client reaches /mcp and sends the normal MCP initialize request.
  4. The server creates a Streamable HTTP session without authenticating the caller.
  5. The caller can list and invoke LINE Desktop tools.
  6. Tool calls execute through the logged-in LINE Desktop application on the user workstation.

Impact

An unauthenticated network client can read LINE chat history through the MCP history tools and can send LINE messages through the send-message tools, including send_message_auto when the tool call requests immediate sending. The attacker does not need LINE credentials or a LINE API token; they only need network reachability to the MCP HTTP port.

The practical impact is disclosure of private LINE conversations and unauthorized messages sent as the logged-in desktop user.

Suggested fix

Require authentication before accepting Streamable HTTP MCP sessions or tool calls. For example:

  • require a bearer token or local secret when --http-mode is used;
  • bind HTTP mode to 127.0.0.1 by default unless the operator explicitly opts into network exposure;
  • refuse to start 0.0.0.0 HTTP mode without authentication;
  • document that host.docker.internal / n8n setups must still authenticate to the MCP server.

A defense-in-depth improvement would also keep send_message_auto disabled unless explicitly enabled by a server-side flag, because it converts MCP tool access into immediate message sending as the desktop user.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-06-26 21:50 UTC
Modified
2026-06-26 22:11 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

line-desktop-mcp

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.1.2 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.1.2

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences