Details
Attacker-owned Sentry project slug → span data for other applications is exported to an attacker-controlled Sentry project, leaking operational telemetry.
The collector fetches the DSN/keys for the attacker's slug and subsequently forwards legitimate traces/logs to the attacker-controlled destination.
Threat model
- Attacker capabilities: remote OTLP trace sender (application-level span emission).
- Operator capabilities: configures Sentry DSN, bearer token, base URL; sets up receiver pipeline.
- The attacker does NOT control operator YAML. The attacker DOES control resource attribute values on spans they emit.
Realistic deployment
- Kubernetes cluster with OpenTelemetry Collector forwarding traces from multiple applications to Sentry SaaS or self-hosted Sentry.
- One compromised or malicious application reaches the collector via OTLP.
- The collector is configured with a valid Sentry bearer token for the organization.
Remediation
Apply the existing projectSlugRegexp to runtime-derived slugs, not only to operator config mappings:
import "regexp"
var runtimeSlugPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$`)
func (s *endpointState) extractProjectSlug(attrs pcommon.Map) string {
attrValue, exists := attrs.Get(s.attributeKey)
if !exists || attrValue.Type() != pcommon.ValueTypeStr {
return ""
}
serviceName := attrValue.Str()
if serviceName == "" {
return ""
}
if s.projectMapping != nil {
if mappedSlug, ok := s.projectMapping[serviceName]; ok {
return mappedSlug
}
}
if !runtimeSlugPattern.MatchString(serviceName) {
return "" // reject; drop the span or use a fallback default project
}
return serviceName
}
Alternatively, reject at URL construction:
func (c *sentryClient) GetProjectKeys(ctx context.Context, orgSlug, projectSlug string) ([]projectKey, error) {
if !runtimeSlugPattern.MatchString(projectSlug) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid project slug: %q", projectSlug)
}
baseURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s/api/0/projects/%s/%s/keys/", c.baseURL, orgSlug, projectSlug)
// ...
}
Apply the runtime regex to ALL slug-derived URL components (including orgSlug if it can ever be attacker-influenced), not just to config-time validation.
Credit
Reported by independent security research by Martin Brodeur.