lettre
Affected
- introduced
0.10.1, fixed0.11.22(semver)
Fixed versions
0.11.22
Fix
- Fixed version
0.11.22cargo update -p lettre --precise 0.11.22
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-46428, RUSTSEC-2026-0141
lettre has TLS hostname verification disabled when using Boring TLS backend
Summary
An inverted-boolean bug in lettre's boring-tls integration silently
disables TLS hostname verification for callers using the default (strict)
configuration. An on-path attacker presenting any chain-valid certificate
for any domain can intercept SMTP submission, including PLAIN/LOGIN
credentials and message contents, against any lettre user built with theboring-tls feature. Other TLS backends (native-tls, rustls) are
unaffected.
Details
boring's SslConnectorBuilder::set_verify_hostname(bool) /verify_hostname(bool) API takes a *verify* flag — true means enforce
hostname verification, false means skip it. (Boring docs:
https://docs.rs/boring/latest/boring/ssl/struct.ConnectConfiguration.html#method.set_verify_hostname)
lettre's TlsParametersBuilder exposes the opposite-named flagaccept_invalid_hostnames: bool — true means *accept invalid* (skip
verification), false means verify. lettre passes this flag directly to
boring at both TLS-upgrade sites, inverting the semantics:
src/transport/smtp/client/net.rs:202 (sync)
.verify_hostname(*accept_invalid_hostnames)
src/transport/smtp/client/async_net.rs:377 (async)
config.set_verify_hostname(accept_invalid_hostnames);
Concrete behaviour under boring-tls:
Boring's own warning on set_verify_hostname:
"If hostname verification is not used, *any* valid certificate for
*any* site will be trusted for use from any other. This introduces
a significant vulnerability to man-in-the-middle attacks."native-tls (src/transport/smtp/client/tls.rs:355) usesdanger_accept_invalid_hostnames(self.accept_invalid_hostnames), whose
flag name and semantics match lettre's — unaffected. rustls uses a
separate verifier path — unaffected.
The bug was introduced in PR #797 ("Add support for boring TLS"), commit
985fa7e, first released in v0.10.1, and persists unchanged through v0.11.21
(latest). Zero existing tests cover accept_invalid_hostnames end-to-end
with any backend, which is why the inversion has gone undetected.
Fix: negate the flag at both call sites. Two-line patch:
- .verify_hostname(*accept_invalid_hostnames)
+ .verify_hostname(!*accept_invalid_hostnames)
- config.set_verify_hostname(accept_invalid_hostnames);
+ config.set_verify_hostname(!accept_invalid_hostnames);
I have the patch ready locally and can push to a private fork if a
collaborative fix branch is preferred.
PoC
Setup (any lettre version >= v0.10.1, built with the boring-tls
feature, default-strict configuration):
attacker.example, signed by any CA in the client's trust store (e.g. a Let's Encrypt cert is sufficient).attacker.example cert on STARTTLS or implicit TLS.mail.example.com: use lettre::transport::smtp::client::{Tls, TlsParameters}; use lettre::{AsyncSmtpTransport, Tokio1Executor, Message}; let tls = TlsParameters::builder("mail.example.com".to_owned()) .build_boring() .unwrap(); let mailer = AsyncSmtpTransport::<Tokio1Executor>::relay( "mail.example.com", )? .tls(Tls::Required(tls)) .build(); mailer.send(message).await?; // succeeds against attackerExpected with hostname verification: handshake fails because the
presented leaf cert's SAN does not match mail.example.com.
Actual on boring-tls: handshake succeeds. lettre proceeds with the
SMTP transaction, sending MAIL FROM, RCPT TO, message body, and any
configured SMTP AUTH credentials to the attacker.
Symmetric inverse PoC (proves the inversion, not just a missing check):
configure .dangerous_accept_invalid_hostnames(true) and try to connect
to a server whose cert SAN matches the connect domain. With the bug,
the handshake *fails* because lettre passes true to verify_hostname
and boring rejects... actually wait, it succeeds (SAN matches). Better
inverse demonstration: connect to a server whose cert SAN matches the
connect domain with accept_invalid_hostnames=true, then connect to a
mismatched-SAN server with the same flag — the latter is rejected,
proving the flag is inverted (the user opted into accepting any name,
yet lettre enforces strict verification).
A reproducer cargo project can be produced on request.
Impact
Who is impacted: any lettre user who
boring-tls feature, AND.dangerous_accept_invalid_hostnames(true)).This is the entire "I want strict TLS" population on boring-tls. They
get the opposite of what they asked for: a TLS handshake that ignores
hostname mismatch.
Exploitation: an attacker on the network path between the lettre client
and the target SMTP server, holding any chain-valid TLS certificate
(e.g. a free Let's Encrypt cert for a domain the attacker owns), can
present that certificate when the lettre client connects to the intended
MX. boring accepts the handshake, lettre proceeds, and the attacker
gains read/write access to:
Confidentiality and integrity impact: High. Availability impact: None
direct (the attacker can choose to forward or drop, but the bug itself
does not deny service).
Cloudflare's email-fwdr independently identified and mitigated this
downstream by promoting a previously-metric-only post-handshake SAN
check to a hard error (fix landed 2026-05-12). Because we're mitigated
downstream, we are not on a publication clock; we are reporting so the
upstream fix can ship and other lettre+boring-tls deployments can stop
relying on per-caller workarounds. Happy to coordinate on embargo
timing.
Affected versions: every released lettre version with boring-tls
support, from v0.10.1 (PR #797, commit 985fa7e) through v0.11.21
(latest). No prior advisory or fix.
Suggested fix: two-line negation of the flag at the boring call sites
(see Details). Patch is ready locally and can be attached to a private
collaboration fork.
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0.10.1, fixed 0.11.22 (semver)0.11.22
0.11.22cargo update -p lettre --precise 0.11.22Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0