openclaw
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2026.2.2(semver)
Fixed versions
2026.2.2
Fix
- Fixed version
2026.2.2npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-28446
OpenClaw has an inbound allowlist policy bypass in voice-call extension (empty caller ID + suffix matching)
Summary
An authentication bypass in the optional voice-call extension/plugin allowed unapproved or anonymous callers to reach the voice-call agent when inbound policy was set to allowlist or pairing.
Deployments that do not install/enable the voice-call extension are not affected.
Affected Packages / Versions
openclaw (npm): <= 2026.2.1>= 2026.2.2Details
In affected versions (for example 2026.2.1), the inbound allowlist check in extensions/voice-call/src/manager.ts used suffix-based matching and accepted empty caller IDs after normalization.
This allowed two bypasses:
from values normalized to an empty string, which caused the allowlist predicate to evaluate as allowed.Proof Of Concept
inboundPolicy: allowlist and allowFrom: ["+15550001234"].15550001234 (for example +99915550001234). The call is accepted.Impact
Only operators who install/enable the optional voice-call extension and use inboundPolicy=allowlist or pairing could have inbound access controls bypassed, potentially allowing unauthorized callers to reach auto-response and tool execution.
Fix
The fix hardens inbound policy handling:
Fix commit(s):
f8dfd034f5d9235c5485f492a9e4ccc114e97fdbThanks @simecek for reporting.
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 2026.2.2 (semver)2026.2.2
2026.2.2npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0