robrichards/xmlseclibs
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed3.1.5(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
3.1.5
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-32313
xmlseclibs: Missing AES-GCM Authentication Tag Validation on Encrypted Nodes Allows for Unauthorized Decryption
Summary
XML nodes encrypted with either aes-128-gcm, aes-192-gcm, or aes-256-gcm lack validation of the authentication tag length.
An attacker can use this to brute-force an authentication tag, recover the GHASH key, and decrypt the encrypted nodes.
It also allows to forge arbitrary ciphertexts without knowing the encryption key.
Details
When decrypting with either aes-128-gcm, aes-192-gcm, or aes-256-gcm here, the $authTag is set from a substr(), but never has its length validated (it should be validated with something like strlen($authTag) == self::AUTHTAG_LENGTH).
For that reason, a shorter than expected data blob will allow for the $authTag to have as short a tag as only one byte (see PHP's documentation%20has%20been%20called.%20Otherwise%20the%20decryption%20may%20succeed%20if%20the%20given%20tag%20only%20matches%20the%20start%20of%20the%20proper%20tag.)).
See this example:
function test($data) {
$ivSize = 12;
$tagSize = 16;
$iv = substr($data, 0, $ivSize);
$data = substr($data, $ivSize);
$offset = 0 - $tagSize;
$tag = substr($data, $offset);
$ct = substr($data, 0, $offset);
echo 'IV: "' . $iv . '"' . PHP_EOL;
echo 'Tag: "' . $tag . '"' . PHP_EOL;
echo 'CT: "' . $ct . '"' . PHP_EOL;
}
/* Outputs:
php > test('myNonceNoncet');
IV: "myNonceNonce"
Tag: "t"
CT: ""
php > test('myNonceNonceta');
IV: "myNonceNonce"
Tag: "ta"
CT: ""
php > test('myNonceNoncetag');
IV: "myNonceNonce"
Tag: "tag"
CT: ""
*/
With a legit ciphertext in hand, this is enough to recover the GHASH key.
With that key, any authenticated tags can be computed offline which allows for decryption of the ciphertext and forgery of arbitrary ciphertexts.
PoC
php -S 127.0.0.1:8888 (taken from this saml test case) - The script expects this private key: sp-private-key.pem.aes-256-gcm) - Here is the SAMLResponse used in the video below: saml_response.txtNote: The steps from 3 to 6 are implemented in this exploit script: nonce_reuse_with_fmt_val_oracle.py.
You can run the script with sage -python nonce_reuse_with_fmt_val_oracle.py -s 'url-encoded_and_base64-encoded_samlresponse'
<xenc:CipherValue> node and apply the following modifications 1. Base64-decode the content 2. Take the first 12 bytes and save them as the nonce 3. Take the last 16 bytes and save them as the tag 4. Now brute-force the tag of an empty ciphertext 1. Loop through all 256 possible byte values (let's call that byte_tag_attempt) 2. Concatenate together the nonce and the byte_tag_attempt 3. Base64-encode the result 4. Replace the content of the <xenc:CipherValue> node with this result 5. On http errors 500, we learn that the tag is valid 6. Do the same for the next byte of the tag until all 16 bytes have been brute-forcedImpact
The general impact is:
In cases where the encryption key is embedded in the XML and is encrypted with the Service Provider's public key (like often done with SAML), the last two items don't have a big impact.
This is because:
SAMLResponseIn any case, secrets that are embedded in the XML, whether coming from an IdP, or from another scheme, can be decrypted.
Important: If static symmetric keys are used, as the GHASH key could have leaked, you must rotate those keys.
References
For additional information on the issue, you can refer to this blog post about the OpenSSL issue and how it can be exploited.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 3.1.5 (ecosystem)3.1.5
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0