github.com/prometheus/prometheus
Affected
- introduced
2.24.1, fixed2.37.4(semver)
Fixed versions
2.37.4
Fix
- Fixed version
2.37.4go get github.com/prometheus/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: None
Prometheus vulnerable to basic authentication bypass
Impact
Prometheus can be secured by a web.yml file that specifies usernames and hashed passwords for basic authentication.
Passwords are hashed with bcrypt, which means that even if you have access to the hash, it is very hard to find the original password back.
However, a flaw in the way this mechanism was implemented in the exporter toolkit makes it possible with people who know the hashed password to authenticate against Prometheus.
A request can be forged by an attacker to poison the internal cache used to cache the computation of hashes and make subsequent requests successful. This cache is used in both happy and unhappy scenarios in order to limit side channel attacks that could tell an attacker if a user is present in the file or not.
Patches
Prometheus 2.37.4 (LTS) and 2.40.4 have been released to address this issue.
Workarounds
There is no workaround but attacker must have access to the hashed password, stored in disk, to bypass the authentication.
Credit
We want to thank Lei Wan for reporting this security issue.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
2.24.1, fixed 2.37.4 (semver)2.37.4
2.37.4go get github.com/prometheus/[email protected]2.38.0, fixed 2.40.4 (semver)2.40.4
2.40.4go get github.com/prometheus/[email protected]2.24.1, fixed 2.37.4 (semver)2.37.4
2.37.4go get github.com/prometheus/prometheus/[email protected]2.38.0, fixed 2.40.4 (semver)2.40.4
2.40.4go get github.com/prometheus/prometheus/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0