mantisbt/mantisbt
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.27.2(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2.27.2
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2025-47776
MantisBT vulnerable to authentication bypass for some passwords due to PHP type juggling
Due to an incorrect use of loose (==) instead of strict (===) comparison in the [authentication code][1], PHP type juggling will cause interpretation of certain MD5 hashes as numbers, specifically those matching scientific notation.
[1]: https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/blob/0fb502dd613991e892ed2224ac5ea3e40ba632bc/core/authentication_api.php#L782
Impact
On MantisBT instances configured to use the *MD5* login method, user accounts having a password hash evaluating to zero (i.e. matching regex ^0+[Ee][0-9]+$) are vulnerable, allowing an attacker knowing the victim's username to login without knowledge of their actual password, using any other password having a hash evaluating to zero, for example comito5 (0e579603064547166083907005281618).
No password bruteforcing for individual users is needed, thus $g_max_failed_login_count does not protect against the attack.
Patches
Workarounds
Check the database for vulnerable accounts, and change those users' passwords, e.g. for MySQL:
SELECT username, email FROM mantis_user_table WHERE password REGEXP '^0+[Ee][0-9]+$'
References
Credits
Thanks to Harry Sintonen / Reversec for discovering and reporting the issue.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 2.27.2 (ecosystem)2.27.2
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0