@anthropic-ai/claude-code
Affected
- introduced
2.1.59, fixed2.1.128(semver)
Fixed versions
2.1.128
Fix
- Fixed version
2.1.128npm install @anthropic-ai/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-46406
@anthropic-ai/claude-code has an Insecure Temporary File in /copy Command that Enables Response Disclosure and Symlink-Based File Write
The Claude Code /copy command wrote responses to a hardcoded, predictable path (/tmp/claude/response.md) without UID isolation, randomness, or symlink protection. The file was created world-readable (0644) in a world-traversable directory (0755), allowing any local user to read a privileged user's Claude response, which could contain secrets or credentials. Additionally, because the path was static and predictable, a local attacker could pre-create the directory and plant a symlink at the expected file path, causing the privileged process to follow the symlink and overwrite an attacker-chosen file with the response text. Exploiting this required a local unprivileged user on the same system and a privileged user to run the /copy command.
Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.
Claude Code thanks hackerone.com/c_h4ck_0 for reporting this issue.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
2.1.59, fixed 2.1.128 (semver)2.1.128
2.1.128npm install @anthropic-ai/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0