github.com/tillitis/tkeyclient
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.3.0(semver)
Fixed versions
1.3.0
Fix
- Fixed version
1.3.0go get github.com/tillitis/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-32953, GO-2026-4728
Tillitis TKey Client has an Error in Protocol Implementation
Impact
Some specific (1 out of 256) User Supplied Secrets (USS) were not used,
making the resulting Compound Device Identifier (CDI) the same as if no
USS was provided.
Affected client applications: all client apps using the
tkeyclient Go module.
Patches
Upgrade to v1.3.0.
NOTE WELL: For the affected end users upgrading an app containingtkeyclient to v1.3.0 means their key material will change. An end
user can get their old keys by not entering any USS. Please make sure
to communicate this to end users.
Affected users
The steps required to assess whether your USS is vulnerable may vary
depending on the client application. The example below shows how to
perform the check using tkey-ssh-agent and the known vulnerable USSadl.
tkey-ssh-agent -p --ussadlpubkey-with-usstkey-ssh-agent -ppubkey-without-ussExpected behavior:pubkey-with-uss and pubkey-without-uss should not be equal.
Observed behavior:pubkey-with-uss and pubkey-without-uss are equal.
Workaround
We recommend everyone using tkeyclient to update to v1.3.0 and
release new versions of the client apps using it.
However, end users that are unable to upgrade to a new version of a client
app, the recommendation is to change to an unaffected USS. Include
specific instructions for your client app.
Details
When loading the device app an optional 32 bytes USS digest is also
sent. The intention is to ask the end user to enter a USS of arbitrary
length, hash it, and then send a 32 bytes digest to TKey.
However, there was a bug when sending the digest from the client. The
index in the outgoing buffer is wrong and overwrites the boolean
defining if the USS is used or not.
This means that if the USS digest begins with a 0, the rest of the
digest is not used at all. If it begins with something else, setting
the boolean to true, the USS is used.
The exported LoadApp() function calls an internal helper functionloadApp() which contains this code:
if len(secretPhrase) == 0 {
tx[6] = 0
} else {
tx[6] = 1 // Note the 6 here
// Hash user's phrase as USS
uss := blake2s.Sum256(secretPhrase)
copy(tx[6:], uss[:]) // Note that 6 is used again
}
A side effect of this behavior is that only 31 bytes of the USS are
used. This is not considered a security issue, but an option has been
added to enforce use of the full USS. See the release notes for
details. To avoid forcing all users to roll their keys, this option is
disabled by default and must be explicitly enabled.
The fix
The fix focuses on solving the vulnerability only by: 1) use correct
index, 2) always use the last 31 bytes of the USS:
if len(secretPhrase) == 0 {
tx[6] = 0
} else {
tx[6] = 1
// Hash user's phrase as USS
uss := blake2s.Sum256(secretPhrase)
copy(tx[7:], uss[1:])
}
This change means the key material of affected end users will change
compared to earlier versions of tkeyclient. They have the choice of:
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 1.3.0 (semver)1.3.0
1.3.0go get github.com/tillitis/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0