Advisory

GHSA-5324-3w58-qpp2

Also known as: CVE-2026-116575

Summary

Mem0: Cross-tenant conversation leak via unescaped delimiter collision in session-scope key (_build_session_scope)

Details

Summary

_build_session_scope() in mem0/memory/main.py builds the conversation-history scope key used to fetch/store the last N raw messages by naively joining caller-supplied user_id/agent_id/run_id values with unescaped & and = delimiters:

def _build_session_scope(filters):
parts = []
for key in sorted(["user_id", "agent_id", "run_id"]):
val = filters.get(key)
if val:
parts.append(f"{key}={val}")
return "&".join(parts)

_validate_and_trim_entity_id() (the only validation applied to these values) rejects only empty/whitespace-only strings — it never forbids & or =. This scope string is then used as an exact-match key against a SQLite column (storage.py: WHERE session_scope = ?) to fetch the last 10 raw messages for a given scope (main.py, Phase 0 of _add_to_vector_store, both sync and async).

Impact

Any caller who controls only their own run_id (or agent_id) — a very common integration shape, since apps frequently pass a client-/session-supplied identifier straight through as run_id without namespacing — can craft a value containing &user_id=<victim> (or &agent_id=<victim>) that produces a scope string byte-for-byte identical to a different tenant's real scope string.

Concretely: Tenant A calls add(msgs, user_id="alice", run_id="proj-x") → scope "run_id=proj-x&user_id=alice". An attacker who can only set run_id calls add(msgs, run_id="proj-x&user_id=alice") → identical scope string. The attacker's next add() call:

  1. Reads Tenant A's raw prior conversation via get_last_messages(session_scope) and splices it verbatim into the attacker's own LLM fact-extraction prompt — a direct cross-tenant confidentiality leak (conversation content, potentially including PII, credentials, etc.).
  2. Writes into the same colliding row-set via save_messages(), whose eviction logic (DELETE FROM messages WHERE session_scope = ? AND id NOT IN (...)) can evict/interleave Tenant A's history — permanent cross-tenant data corruption, not just a read.

Reachable via the public Memory.add() / AsyncMemory.add() API, and by extension the REST server's POST /memories endpoint (which takes run_id/agent_id straight from the request body).

Reproduction

from mem0.memory.main import _build_session_scope

Tenant A: real user_id + run_id
scope_a = _build_session_scope({"user_id": "alice", "run_id": "proj-x"})
print(scope_a) # "run_id=proj-x&user_id=alice"

Attacker: controls only run_id, embeds a fake user_id inside it
scope_c = _build_session_scope({"run_id": "proj-x&user_id=alice"})
print(scope_c) # "run_id=proj-x&user_id=alice"

assert scope_a == scope_c # byte-for-byte collision

A full end-to-end proof (actual add() calls, no mocking of the vulnerable functions) confirms the attacker's subsequent add() call receives the victim's raw prior message content via get_last_messages.

Suggested Fix

Reject & and = in _validate_and_trim_entity_id(), alongside the existing whitespace check — this is the single validation chokepoint already used by every entry point (add, search, get_all, delete_all), so the fix is centralized. Alternatively/additionally, encode each component unambiguously (percent-encode each id, or use a length-prefixed/JSON-encoded scope key) so no valid-character combination in one field can ever collide with a different partition.

Also affected: TypeScript SDK (npm mem0ai)

The same flaw exists in mem0-ts/src/oss/src/memory/index.ts,
Memory.buildSessionScope(), which joins agent_id/run_id/user_id into the same
key=value&key=value string with the delimiters unescaped:

private buildSessionScope(filters: SearchFilters): string {
const parts: string[] = [];
for (const key of ["agent_id", "run_id", "user_id"].sort()) {
const val = (filters as any)[key];
if (val) parts.push(${key}=${val});
}
return parts.join("&");
}

The scope string is used the same way, as an exact-match key into the messages
table via SQLiteManager.getLastMessages() and saveMessages(), so the identical
forge, cross-tenant read and eviction all apply.

Verified against the current releases as of 2026-07-26: pip mem0ai v2.0.14 and
npm mem0ai ts-v3.1.2 both still contain the unescaped join.

Reporter: Abhinav Singh (GitHub: OfficialAbhinavSingh)

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-10-28 21:17 UTC
Modified
2026-10-28 21:30 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

mem0ai

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 2.0.18 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

2.0.18

Fix

  • Fixed version 2.0.18
    pip install --upgrade mem0ai==2.0.18

mem0ai

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 3.1.6 (semver)

Fixed versions

3.1.6

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences