github.com/Tencent/WeKnora
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.2.12(semver)
Fixed versions
0.2.12
Fix
- Fixed version
0.2.12go get github.com/Tencent/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-30247, GO-2026-4628
WeKnora is Vulnerable to SSRF via Redirection
Summary
The application's "Import document via URL" feature is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) through HTTP redirects. While the backend implements comprehensive URL validation (blocking private IPs, loopback addresses, reserved hostnames, and cloud metadata endpoints), it fails to validate redirect targets. An attacker can bypass all protections by using a redirect chain, forcing the server to access internal services. Additionally, Docker-specific internal addresses like host.docker.internal are not blocked.
Details
The /api/v1/knowledge-bases/{id}/knowledge/url endpoint validates the initial URL but follows HTTP redirects without re-validating the destination. This allows attackers to:
Validation Gaps
IsSSRFSafeURL() function (in internal/utils/security.go) validates the initial URL thoroughly, but there's no validation of HTTP redirect targetshost.docker.internal is not in the restrictedHostnames listparsed.Hostname() from the initial URL, but redirect Location headers bypass this checkRoot Cause Analysis
The backend makes the security mistake of trusting the server's HTTP client library to be secure. In Go, when using http.Get() or similar functions, the standard library will automatically follow redirects up to 10 times by default. The SSRF validation only checks the URL passed to the endpoint, not intermediate redirects.
PoC
Step 1: Set up an attacker-controlled server that responds with a redirect:
HTTP/1.1 307 Temporary Redirect
Location: http://host.docker.internal:7777
Content-Type: text/html
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Step 2: Send the request with a clean URL:
POST /api/v1/knowledge-bases/dbadd153-9e60-4213-9553-9f78dbcba0dc/knowledge/url HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer <valid_token>
{"url":"https://attacker-domain.com","tag_id":""}
The URL https://attacker-domain.com passes all validation checks because:
✓ Valid https:// scheme
✓ Not an IP address (it's a domain)
✓ Not in restricted hostnames
✓ Doesn't resolve to a private IP (assuming attacker controls a public domain)
Step 3: The backend's HTTP client follows the redirect to http://host.docker.internal:7777, which:
✗ Is not validated
✗ host.docker.internal is not in the blocklist
✗ Successfully accesses the internal service
Impact
Vulnerability Type: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via HTTP Redirect
Who is Impacted:
Potential Consequences:
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 0.2.12 (semver)0.2.12
0.2.12go get github.com/Tencent/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0