Details
Control/negative case: the same test first sends the request without Authorization and expects 401 Unauthorized. The subsequent Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token request succeeds and returns the fixture, proving the bypass is not an intentionally unauthenticated endpoint but an unvalidated-header check.
Impact
An unauthenticated network attacker can enumerate Constellation device metadata from deployments that enable the Constellation/VPN feature and have visible devices. The response exposes device names, user nicknames, internal/VPN IP addresses, node roles such as lighthouse/relay/exit-node flags, public hostnames, and ports. This information can reveal private network topology and user/device inventory and can support targeted follow-on attacks against the VPN or exposed nodes.
The issue does not require a valid Cosmos session, valid Cosmos API token, valid Constellation token, or user interaction; any arbitrary non-empty bearer string is accepted.
Suggested remediation
Replace the header-presence check with real authorization. Depending on the intended trust model, the handler should require one of:
- a valid Cosmos user/API token with an appropriate permission such as
PERM_RESOURCES_READorPERM_CONFIGURATION_READ, or - a dedicated Constellation device/API token that is cryptographically verified and used to scope the query to devices the caller is allowed to see.
Also add regression tests for:
- missing
Authorizationheader returns 401, - malformed/arbitrary bearer token returns 401,
- invalid
cosmos_API token returns 401 through middleware, - valid but underprivileged token is rejected,
- valid authorized token returns only permitted devices.
Credits
- Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&D)
- Nguyen Huy Vu Dung from VinSOC Labs (AppSec)