github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected1.99(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-33030, GO-2026-4901
nginx-UI has Unencrypted Storage of DNS API Tokens and ACME Private Keys
Summary
Nginx-UI contains an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability that allows any authenticated user to access, modify, and delete resources belonging to other users. The application's base Model struct lacks a user_id field, and all resource endpoints perform queries by ID without verifying user ownership, enabling complete authorization bypass in multi-user environments.
Severity
High - CVSS 3.1 Score: 8.8 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Note: Original score was 7.5. The score was updated to 8.8 after discovering that sensitive data (DNS API tokens, ACME private keys) is stored in plaintext, which when combined with IDOR allows immediate credential theft without decryption.
Product
nginx-ui
Affected Versions
All versions up to and including v2.3.3
CWE
CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Description
Exposed DNS Provider Credentials
The dns.Config structure (internal/cert/dns/config_env.go) contains API credentials:
type Configuration struct {
Credentials map[string]string `json:"credentials"` // API tokens here
Additional map[string]string `json:"additional"`
}
| Provider | Credential Fields | Impact if Leaked |
|----------|------------------|------------------|
| Cloudflare | CF_API_TOKEN | Full DNS zone control |
| Alibaba Cloud DNS | ALICLOUD_ACCESS_KEY, ALICLOUD_SECRET_KEY | Full DNS control + potential IAM access |
| Tencent Cloud DNS | TENCENTCLOUD_SECRET_ID, TENCENTCLOUD_SECRET_KEY | Full DNS control |
| AWS Route53 | AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY | Route53 + potential AWS access |
| GoDaddy | GODADDY_API_KEY, GODADDY_API_SECRET | DNS record modification |
Combined Attack: IDOR + Plaintext Storage
When the IDOR vulnerability is combined with plaintext storage, attackers can directly extract API tokens from other users' resources:
Attack Chain:
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 1. Attacker authenticates with low-privilege account │
│ 2. Uses IDOR to enumerate: /api/dns_credentials/1,2,3... │
│ 3. Reads plaintext API tokens directly from HTTP response │
│ 4. No decryption needed - tokens stored in cleartext │
│ 5. Uses stolen tokens to: │
│ - Modify DNS records (domain hijacking) │
│ - Issue fraudulent SSL certificates │
│ - Pivot to cloud infrastructure │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
PoC: Extracting Plaintext Credentials via IDOR
# Attacker with low-privilege token accessing admin's DNS credential
curl -H "Authorization: $ATTACKER_TOKEN" \
https://nginx-ui.example.com/api/dns_credentials/1
# Response contains PLAINTEXT API token (no decryption required):
{
"id": 1,
"name": "Production Cloudflare",
"provider": "cloudflare",
"config": {
"credentials": {
"CF_API_TOKEN": "yhyQ7xR...plaintext_token_visible..."
}
}
}
Updated CVSS Score with Plaintext Storage
The plaintext storage increases the confidentiality impact:
CVSS 3.1 Score: 8.8 (High)
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
---
Attack Scenario: Certificate Hijacking
1. Attacker creates low-privilege account on nginx-ui
2. Uses IDOR to enumerate all DNS credentials: /api/dns_credentials/1,2,3...
3. Steals Cloudflare API token from admin's credential
4. Uses token to:
- Modify DNS records
- Issue fraudulent Let's Encrypt certificates
- Intercept traffic to victim domains
Credit
Discovered by security researcher during authorized security audit.
Recommendation
Immediate Mitigation
// model/model.go
type Model struct {
ID uint64 `gorm:"primary_key" json:"id"`
UserID uint64 `gorm:"index" json:"user_id"` // Add this field
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"created_at"`
UpdatedAt time.Time `json:"updated_at"`
DeletedAt *gorm.DeletedAt `gorm:"index" json:"deleted_at,omitempty"`
}
// api/certificate/dns_credential.go
func GetDnsCredential(c *gin.Context) {
id := cast.ToUint64(c.Param("id"))
currentUser := c.MustGet("user").(*model.User)
d := query.DnsCredential
dnsCredential, err := d.Where(
d.ID.Eq(id),
d.UserID.Eq(currentUser.ID), // Add user filter
).First()
if err != nil {
cosy.ErrHandler(c, err)
return
}
// ...
}
// middleware/authorization.go
func RequireOwnership(resourceType string) gin.HandlerFunc {
return func(c *gin.Context) {
currentUser := c.MustGet("user").(*model.User)
resourceID := cast.ToUint64(c.Param("id"))
// Check if resource belongs to current user
ownerID, err := getResourceOwner(resourceType, resourceID)
if err != nil || ownerID != currentUser.ID {
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{
"message": "Access denied",
})
return
}
c.Next()
}
}
Database Migration
-- Add user_id column to all resource tables
ALTER TABLE dns_credentials ADD COLUMN user_id BIGINT;
ALTER TABLE certs ADD COLUMN user_id BIGINT;
ALTER TABLE acme_users ADD COLUMN user_id BIGINT;
ALTER TABLE sites ADD COLUMN user_id BIGINT;
ALTER TABLE streams ADD COLUMN user_id BIGINT;
ALTER TABLE configs ADD COLUMN user_id BIGINT;
-- Set default owner for existing resources
UPDATE dns_credentials SET user_id = 1 WHERE user_id IS NULL;
UPDATE certs SET user_id = 1 WHERE user_id IS NULL;
-- Add foreign key constraint
ALTER TABLE dns_credentials ADD CONSTRAINT fk_dns_credentials_user
FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES users(id);
Long-term Improvements
---
Remediation for Plaintext Storage
Immediate Fix: Encrypt Sensitive Fields
Apply the same serializer:json[aes] pattern used for S3 credentials to DNS and ACME data:
model/dns_credential.go:
type DnsCredential struct {
Model
Name string `json:"name"`
Config *dns.Config `json:"config,omitempty" gorm:"serializer:json[aes]"` // Add AES encryption
Provider string `json:"provider"`
ProviderCode string `json:"provider_code" gorm:"index"`
}High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, last affected 1.99 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0